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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
John R. Walk *
Jaime B. Wisegarver **
INTRODUCTION
This article surveys recent significant developments in Virginia
civil practice and procedure. The article discusses opinions of the
Supreme Court of Virginia from June 2014 through June 2015
addressing noteworthy civil procedure topics, amendments to the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia concerning procedural is-
sues during the same period, and legislation enacted by the Vir-
ginia General Assembly during its 2015 session that relates to
civil practice.
I. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Fees for Filing Civil Actions
The procedural decision of the past year that has garnered by
far the most attention and discussion is the Supreme Court of
Virginia's unpublished order in Landini v. Bil-Jax, Inc.,' popular-
ly known as the "two dollars short case." The case involved a fil-
ing just prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations where
the filing fee tendered was literally "two dollars short" due to a
recent increase in the court's library fee.2 Rules 3:2 and 3:3 of the
Supreme Court of Virginia state that an action is deemed com-
menced-and thus the statute of limitations tolled-when a com-
* Shareholder, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 1980, University
of Richmond School of Law; B.A., 1977, College of William & Mary.
** Associate, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2010, University of
Richmond School of Law; B.A., 2005, University of Virginia.
1. No. 140591 (Va. Jan. 30, 2015) (unpublished order).
2. Id. at 1-2.
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plaint is tendered to the clerk.' The Rules go on to state that the
clerk "shall receive and file all pleadings when tendered. . .. "'
In Landini, plaintiffs counsel timely filed the complaint with
the clerk, but the check accompanying the filing was deficient by
two dollars.5 The clerk held the papers for six days and did not
stamp them as "filed."6 On the sixth day-which coincidentally
was the final day of the statute of limitations period-the clerk
notified plaintiffs counsel of the omission.' No mention was made
that the papers had not been stamped as "filed."8 A check for the
two dollar deficiency was mailed to the court and the action was
stamped as "filed" upon receipt of the check but, unfortunately,
after the limitations period had expired.9
The Supreme Court of Virginia's analysis is rather short but
turns on an interpretation of Virginia Code section 17.1-275.10
Subsection (A)(13) lists the fees for filing civil actions and con-
cludes with the statement: "The fees prescribed above shall be
collected upon the filing of papers for the commencement of civil
actions."'1 The particular arrearage involved had to do with the
library fee, and some of the opinion is unique to interpreting
whether under the statute the library fee is "prescribed above"
since it is mentioned in section 17.1-275(D).12 However, the larger
takeaway from this case is that, contrary to what many thought
was clearly specified in Rules 3:2 and 3:3, an action is not neces-
sarily "filed" upon tendering a complaint to the clerk.3 Curiously,
the Order does not even mention these rules.4
The court revisited the subject in Alexandria Redevelopment &
Housing Authority v. Walker.5 In this case, the Alexandria Rede-
velopment and Housing Authority ("ARHA") had filed its Notice
3. VA. SuP. CT. R. 3:2, 3:3 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
4. R. 3:3 (Repl. Vol. 2015).




9. Id. at 1-2.
10. Id. at 2.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-275(A)(13) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
12. See Landini, No. 140591, at 2-3.
13. See id. at 3.
14. See id. at 1-3.
15. 289 Va. -_, 772 S.E.2d 297 (2015).
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of Appeal via commercial courier."6 The package was dispatched
for overnight delivery the day before the expiration of the thirty-
day deadline.7 The courier, however, delivered the package to the
record room, where it sat overnight.'" The next day-one day after
the deadline-the clerk stamped the notice of appeal as "filed."
1 9
Thus, the issue was whether ARHA had timely noted its appeal."
Holding the Notice of Appeal timely "filed," notwithstanding
the clerk's error, and citing to Rule 3:3, Justice Kelsey wrote:
"When not filed electronically, a pleading is filed when it is physi-
cally delivered to the clerk of court."" In case the meaning of the
above was not clear, Justice Kelsey went on to quote from Milton
v. United States, to the effect that "filed" when applied to court
proceedings is a term of art with a "well understood meaning"
and entails "merely the depositing of the instrument with the
custodian for the purpose of being filed ....
The implication of the foregoing discussion is that in Landini,
the clerk should have received and stamped in the complaint as
"filed," notwithstanding the deficiency in the filing fee. The refer-
ence in Professor W. Hamilton Bryson's treatise, which Justice
Kelsey cites with approval, states this proposition expressly.
23
However, the only mention of Landini in the opinion is in a foot-
note that reads: "This appeal does not require us to address
whether, and to what extent, the failure to tender certain fees
renders a physically delivered pleading incapable of being filed."'
4
Thus, practitioners are left to guess whether the court was signal-
ing that Landini would not be followed in future cases. Clarity





21. Id. at -, 772 S.E.2d at 300-01 (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 3.3 (Repl. Vol. 2015) ("The
clerk shall receive and file all pleadings when tendered .. ")); Mears v. Mears, 206 Va.
444, 446, 143 S.E.2d 889, 890 (1965) (holding that a paper "is 'filed' when delivered to the
clerk by the agent selected by counsel"); W. HAMILTON BRYSON, VIRGINIA CML
PROCEDURE § 6:01, at 6-3 (4th ed. 2005).
22. Walker, 289 Va. at _, 772 S.E.2d at 300 (quoting Milton v. United States, 105
F.2d 253, 255 (5th Cir. 1939)).
23. Id. (citing W. HAMILTON BRYSON, VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6:01, at 6-3 (4th
ed. 2005)).
24. Id. at__, 772 S.E.2d at 301 n.8.
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will likely come in the form of legislative action as major bar
groups are already lining up to advocate for a curative amend-
ment to Virginia Code section 17.1-245.
B. Nonsuits
In its opinion in Temple v. Mary Washington Hospital, Inc., the
Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether the discovery rul-
ings made by the circuit court in a prior, nonsuited action were
properly before the court on appeal.5 Jo Ann Knighten Temple,
Administrator of the Estate of Ellis Ethelbert Temple ("dece-
dent"), filed a complaint which alleged wrongful death and medi-
cal malpractice against Mary Washington Hospital and other de-
fendants involved in the emergency treatment of the decedent,
who had arrived at the hospital complaining of shortness of
breath and chest pain and who died approximately four hours
later of a heart attack.6
During the course of pretrial discovery, disputes arose concern-
ing the hospital's refusal to produce certain information.27 Specifi-
cally, the hospital refused to produce its policies and procedures
related to the management, care, and treatment of patients pre-
senting with conditions requiring cardiac monitoring.28 The hospi-
tal also refused to produce information regarding its electronic
charting system.29 Both of these discovery requests by Temple
were the subject of a motion to compel, which the trial court de-
nied on the basis that the hospital's "policies and procedures were
not relevant, would not lead to discoverable evidence, and were
privileged."" Regarding Temple's request for electronic data, the
trial court found that all relevant documents had already been
disclosed.1
Temple later filed a second motion to compel in which she
asked the trial court to order the hospital to produce certain la-
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boratory documents.32 The hospital responded that a document
previously produced was the only document responsive to that re-
quest.33 The trial court denied the motion to compel.3 4
Temple took a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Virginia Code
section 8.01-380 before the case went to trial.35 "Temple then filed
a new complaint in the same court and against the same defend-
ants, alleging the same cause of action."36 Subsequently, "the trial
court entered an agreed order to incorporate the discovery con-
ducted and taken in the [original] action.,37 The case went to trial,
and a jury returned a verdict for the defense.38 Temple then filed
a motion for a new trial and to reconsider certain evidentiary rul-
ings, including the rulings on the motions to compel.3" The trial
court denied the motion for a new trial.4 °
On appeal, the supreme court considered the effect of the non-
suit on the trial court's discovery rulings.4' The defendants argued
that Temple could not appeal the discovery rulings in the original
action because the agreed order only incorporated the "discovery
conducted and taken" in the prior action, not the motions, objec-
tions, rulings, and order from the original action.42 Thus, accord-
ing to the defendants, those rulings were not a part of the later-
filed action and therefore were not properly before the court on
appeal.43 Temple responded that the agreed order incorporating
"all discovery conducted and taken" was clearly intended to in-
clude "all of the parties' motions and objections, as well as the tri-
al court's rulings related to the discovery disputes.4 4 Temple also
argued that the parties' comments at a hearing in the later-filed
action demonstrated their understanding that they were to be
32. Id. at 137-38, 762 S.E.2d at 752.
33. Id. at 138, 762 S.E.2d at 752.
34. Id.
35. Id., 762 S.E.2d at 753.
36. Id.
37. Id. Specifically, the order stated, "All discovery conducted and taken in the previ-
ous action that the Plaintiff brought against the Defendants... is hereby incorporated




41. Id. at 138-39, 762 S.E.2d at 753.
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bound by all arguments and rulings from the nonsuited action.45
The supreme court disagreed46
Interpreting section 8.01-380,47 the court explained that a re-
filed action after a nonsuit is a completely new action. Once
Temple chose to exercise her right to take a voluntary nonsuit, it
was as if the original action had never been filed.4' Thus, for any
aspect of the nonsuited action to be incorporated into the later-
filed case, an order had to explicitly permit it. ° In this case, the
court held that "motions, objections, and trial court orders do not
constitute discovery."51 The trial court's order incorporating "all
discovery conducted and taken" included the interrogatories, dep-
ositions, documents, and requests for admissions, but did not in-
clude the motions to compel, objections, transcripts of hearings, or
the trial court's rulings on the motions.5" Because the order did
not explicitly incorporate these motions, objections, and rulings,
following the nonsuit, it was as if those motions, objections, and
rulings had never existed.55 Accordingly, the court could not reach
the merits of Temple's assignments of error.
4
In Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc. v. Cantrell, the Supreme
Court of Virginia again considered the nonsuit statute, specifical-
ly, the question: when is an action "submitted to the court for de-
cision" within the meaning of the nonsuit statute, section 8.01-
380(A)?55 After working as a boiler tender at Anheuser-Busch for
45. Id.
46. Id. at 139-41, 762 S.E.2d at 753-54.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380 (Repl. Vol. 2015) ("A party shall not be allowed to suffer
a nonsuit. .. unless he does so before a motion to strike the evidence has been sustained
or before the jury retires from the bar or before the action has been submitted to the court
for decision.").
48. Temple, 288 Va. at 139, 762 S.E.2d at 753.




53. Id. at 140-41, 762 S.E.2d at 754. The court also held that because a trial court
speaks only through its written orders and that such orders are presumed to reflect accu-
rately what transpired, the parties' comments at a hearing regarding their understanding
of the order could not be considered on appeal. Id.
54. Id. at 141, 762 S.E.2d at 754.
55. See 289 Va ..... 770 S.E.2d 499, 500 (2015). The nonsuit statute states, in per-
tinent part:
A party shall not be allowed to suffer a nonsuit as to any cause of action or
claim, or any other party to the proceeding, unless he does so before a motion
[Vol. 50:39
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eighteen years, Garland Cantrell was diagnosed with mesotheli-
oma."6 Cantrell filed an amended complaint against seventeen de-
fendants who owned the premises where he had worked, alleging
that their negligence proximately caused his illness.57 The de-
fendants filed demurrers to the amended complaint, which
Cantrell opposed.5" After the demurrers were fully briefed and a
hearing conducted, the circuit court informed the parties "that it
would take the demurrers under advisement.""9
Several weeks later, the circuit court notified the parties that
"its decision would be forthcoming.""° The next day, Cantrell filed
a complaint in the Circuit Court of the City of Newport News
against all but four of the remaining defendants in the Norfolk
case, alleging substantially similar claims."s "The day after filing
his complaint in Newport News, Cantrell moved to nonsuit the
amended complaint pending in Norfolk" under Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-380.6" The defendants in the Norfolk proceeding opposed
the nonsuit motion, arguing that the claims pending there had
been "submitted to the court for decision" within the meaning of
section 8.01-380(A).63 The circuit court disagreed and granted
Cantrell's motion for nonsuit, at which point the defendants ap-
pealed.64
The supreme court explained that pursuant to section 8.01-
380(A), "[a] party shall not be allowed to suffer a nonsuit as to
any cause of action or claim, or any other party to the proceeding,
to strike the evidence has been sustained or before the jury retires from the
bar or before the action has been submitted to the court for decision. After a
nonsuit no new proceeding on the same cause of action or against the same
party shall be had in any court other than that in which the nonsuit was tak-
en, unless that court is without jurisdiction, or not a proper venue, or other
good cause is shown for proceeding in another court, or when such new pro-
ceeding is instituted in a federal court. If after a nonsuit an improper venue
is chosen, the court shall not dismiss the matter but shall transfer it to the
proper venue upon motion of any party.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
56. Cantrell, 289 Va. at -, 770 S.E.2d at 499 (2015).
57. Id. at __ 770 S.E.2d at 499-500.
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unless he does so ... before the action has been submitted to the
court for decision."6 In an earlier decision, the court had deter-
mined that an action is "submitted to the court for decision" when
it "is in the hands of the trial judge for final disposition, either on
,,66a dispositive motion or upon the merits.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has previously established that
a demurrer is a dispositive motion,67 and so in this case, the court
ruled that the defendants' demurrer, as well as their pleas in bar
and motions to dismiss, were all dispositive pleadings that pre-
cluded a nonsuit under section 8.01-380(A).68 Thus, the court held
that the circuit court erred in granting Cantrell's nonsuit motion
after the parties had completed their briefing and argument on
the demurrers." As neither the parties nor the court anticipated
any further proceedings on the demurrers, those pleadings were
committed to the court for its ruling.°
C. Evidence
The sufficiency of the plaintiffs' evidence was the central issue
on appeal in Owens v. DRS Automotive Fantomworks, Inc.-a
case that concerned the repair and renovation of an antique au-
tomobile.71 Richard L. Owens and his wife, Cynthia M. Owens,
hired DRS Automotive Fantomworks, Inc. and its owner, Daniel
R. Short, to repair and restore their 1960 Ford Thunderbird.2 The
parties did not enter into a written contract, but Short estimated
that the project could be completed for approximately $40,000.1
3
Short advised the Owenses that the most economical way to
find replacement parts for the Thunderbird would be to purchase
65. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
66. Id. (quoting Bio-Medical Applications of Va., Inc. v. Coston, 272 Va. 489, 493-94,
634 S.E.2d 349, 351 (2006)).
67. Wells v. Lorcom House Condominiums' Council of Co-Owners, 237 Va. 247, 252,
377 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1989).
68. See Cantrell, 289 Va. at __, 770 S.E.2d at 500; see also Virginia Marine Res.
Comm'n v. Clark, 281 Va. 679, 685 n.3, 709 S.E.2d 150, 154 n.3 (2011) (describing demur-
rers as dispositive motions).
69. Cantrell, 289 Va. at -, 770 S.E.2d at 500.
70. Id.
71. 288 Va. 489, 764 S.E.2d 256 (2014).
72. Id. at 492, 764 S.E.2d at 257.
73. Id. at 492-93, 764 S.E.2d at 257.
[Vol. 50:39
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a "donor car" with a compatible engine.74 The plaintiffs testified
that Short told them that a donor car could likely be purchased at
auction for "a few thousand dollars."75 Short then located a 2001
Ford Crown Victoria Police Interceptor for sale by Lieutenant Al-
exander Theiss near his shop.76 Theiss had advertised the Inter-
ceptor on the internet for $2000, but at trial, Short testified that
he never saw this advertisement." Short and Theiss negotiated aprice of $6000 for the Interceptor.8
Short had previously provided the Owenses with written notice
of the terms upon which he conducted his business.79 Included in
those terms was the condition that a 25% markup would be
charged for parts purchased for the work."0 On the list of antici-
pated costs for parts and labor that Short gave to the Owenses, he
stated the cost for the purchase of the Interceptor was $7200, in-
cluding the markup.8 After receiving this list, the Owenses made
a second installment payment to Short, followed by frequent vis-
its to the DRS shop to discuss the continuing work and to request
additional repairs."
The amicable relationship between the parties quickly deterio-
rated when Short received a letter from Mrs. Owens demanding
documentation of all costs for parts and labor; identification of all
suppliers; and other information pertinent to the project.83 Short
suspended the work on the Thunderbird and offered two opportu-
nities for the Owenses to have the vehicle inspected, but they re-
sponded by filing a complaint in circuit court alleging breach of
contract, violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act
("VCPA"), fraud, and detinue.84
74. Id. at 493, 764 S.E.2d at 257.




79. Id. at 494, 764 S.E.2d at 258.




84. Id. at 494, 764 S.E.2d at 258-59. The detinue claim was later dismissed and thus
was not at issue on appeal. Id. at 494 n.2, 764 S.E.2d at 259 n.2.
2015]
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The case went to a three-day jury trial." "At the conclusion of
the plaintiffs' case, the defendants moved the court to strike the
plaintiffs' evidence as to all counts."8 "The court granted the mo-
tion as to the fraud and VCPA counts and overruled it as to the
count for breach of contract."87 The defendants renewed their mo-
tion to strike after presenting their evidence, but the court denied
the motion.88 The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and
the plaintiff appealed.
The plaintiffs assigned three errors on appeal: (1) that the trial
court erred in striking the evidence based on a finding that two
witnesses were "believable" and "credible"; (2) that the trial court
erred in striking the evidence on the VCPA claim by ruling that a
VCPA claim requires proof of fraud; and (3) that the trial court
erred by striking the VCPA claim because the evidence was suffi-
cient to show a violation of the VCPA.90
With regard to the first assignment of error, the court deter-
mined that the key issue was whether the defendants had actual-
ly paid $6000 for the Interceptor, or if they had paid a lesser
amount, as argued by the plaintiffs.91 Importantly, the only wit-
nesses who had any knowledge of the Interceptor purchase were
Short and Theiss, who both testified that the purchase price was
$6000.92 Theiss was called as a witness by the plaintiffs and as
such, the plaintiffs were bound by his uncontradicted testimony.3
At the conclusion of the trial, the only evidence before the jury re-
garding the purchase price of the Interceptor was that $6000 had
been paid.4 Although the trial court judge may have remarked
that the testimony of Short and Theiss was credible and believa-
ble, these comments were simply indicative of the fact that their
testimony had not been refuted and was not, on its face, unwor-
85. Id. at 494, 764 S.E.2d at 259.
86. Id.
87. Id.





93. Id. at 495-96, 764 S.E.2d at 259-60.
94. Id. at 496, 764 S.E.2d at 260.
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thy of belief.9 The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the
trial court did not err in striking the evidence.96
The court considered the second and third assignments of error
together, and, adhering to the rules of statutory construction, in-
terpreted the VCPA as providing a remedy for more than simply
fraud.97 Unlike proof of fraud, the VCPA does not require the con-
sumer to prove in every case "that misrepresentations were made
knowingly or with the intent to deceive."9 8 Applying this broad in-
terpretation of the VCPA, the court held that the Owenses had
"failed to produce evidence of misrepresentations concerning the
purchase price of the Interceptor."99 Further, even if certain
statements by Short could be construed as misrepresentations,
the Owenses had offered no evidence of any loss that they suf-
fered from reliance upon those statements.'0 In sum, the Ow-
enses' evidence had failed to meet the requirements of Virginia
Code section 59.1-204(A).101
In Ramsey v. Commissioner of Highways, an eminent domain
case concerning the valuation of certain property located in the
city of Virginia Beach, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered
the admissibility of a pre-settlement appraisal of a property's fair
market value. '
In 2009, the Commissioner of Highways sought to acquire a
portion of the Ramseys' property in order to make road improve-
ments to Route 264."°3 Before making an offer, the Commissioner
ordered an appraisal of the property as set forth in Virginia Code
sections 25.1-204 and -417.104 Thomas M. Savage conducted the
appraisal and valued the entire property before acquisition at
$500,000.'' Savage opined that just compensation for the to-be-
acquired portion of the property was $246,292.16 The Commis-




99. See id. at 498, 764 S.E.2d at 260-61.
100. Id. at 498, 764 S.E.2d at 261.
101. Id.
102. 289 Va. - 770 S.E.2d 487 (2015).
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sioner then attempted, unsuccessfully, to purchase the property
directly from the Ramseys.1
7
Shortly thereafter, the Commissioner filed a Certificate of Take
with the trial court certifying that he had deposited $248,707-
the estimated fair value of the property to be acquired-with the
clerk of court.08 The Ramseys withdrew the money from the clerk
of court."9 Subsequently, the Commissioner filed a Petition in
Condemnation, requiring an order confirming that the title to the
desired portion of property be vested in the Commonwealth, and
asking that a jury determine the value of the property.1 °
The Commissioner then hired Lawrence J. Colorito, Jr. to con-
duct a second appraisal."' At trial, Colorito testified as an expert
witness and asserted that the market value of the Ramseys' prop-
erty was $250,000, and that just compensation for the acquired
portion was $92,127.112 During the trial, the Ramseys sought to
have Savage's initial appraisal admitted into evidence."3 The trial
court denied admission of the Savage appraisal on the basis that
it was an offer to settle."' The jury found just compensation for
the Ramseys' property to be $234,032 and the trial court later is-
sued a final order confirming that title in the relevant portion of
the property vested in the Commonwealth.
1
5
On appeal, the Ramseys argued that the trial court erred in re-
fusing to admit oral and written evidence of the property value as
determined by Savage's appraisal."' According to the Ramseys,
the trial court erroneously treated the Savage appraisal as part of
the Commissioner's offer, when in fact the appraisal was com-
pleted before any offer was made to purchase the property."7 The
court considered this issue to be not just a question of the admis-














CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
The court explained that in an eminent domain proceeding, a
condemnor must make "a bona fide but ineffectual effort to pur-
chase from the owner the property to be condemned."'19 Im-
portantly, "[b]efore initiating negotiations for real property, the
state agency shall establish an amount which it believes to be just
compensation therefor and shall make a prompt offer to acquire
the property for the full amount so established."'20 Pursuant to
section 25.1-417(A)(2), "[r]eal property shall be appraised before
the initiation of negotiations ....
Because the Ramseys were given the Savage appraisal before
any offer to purchase was made, the court held that the Savage
appraisal was admissible into evidence as pre-condemnation par-
ty admissions by the Commissioner.122 Consistent with the lan-
guage of section 25.1-417(A)(2), the Savage appraisal was a fair
market value determination prepared "before the initiation of ne-
gotiations," and thus should not have been excluded.123 The court
went on to hold that Savage's pre-settlement appraisal was rele-
vant evidence that was not unfairly prejudicial, and had proba-
tive value in furthering the purpose of the eminent domain pro-
cedure-which is to fully and justly compensate landowners for
the value of their property.'2 4 Accordingly, the trial court erred in
finding that the Savage appraisal was an offer to settle and, as
such, was inadmissible at trial.'
25
D. Default Judgment
Sauder v. Ferguson involved an appeal from the final order of
the circuit court denying a motion to set aside default judgment.6
After Susan M. Sauder and Dennie Lee Ferguson, Jr. were in-
volved in a car accident, Ferguson's insurer, Progressive Gulf In-
surance Company, filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a
ruling that it was not obligated to provide coverage for the acci-
119. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-204(A) (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
120. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-204(E)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-417(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
122. Ramsey, 289 Va. at -, 770 S.E.2d at 489-91.
123. Id. at , 770 S.E.2d at 490 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 25.1-417(A)(2) (Cum. Supp.
2015)).
124. Id. at_, 770 S.E.2d at 490.
125. Id. at_, 770 S.E.2d at 491.
126. 289 Va. -, 771 S.E.2d 664 (2015).
2015]
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dent.'27 The named defendants included Sauder, Ferguson, and
Rockingham Casualty Company-the insurer from whom Sauder
had purchased an uninsured motorist policy.'28
While the declaratory judgment action was pending, Ferguson
testified in a deposition that he was living with his mother in
Harrisonburg, Virginia, at the time of the accident.129 Ferguson
again testified that he was living with his mother at the trial of
the declaratory judgment action.3 ' "At the conclusion of the trial,
the circuit court ruled that Ferguson was an uninsured motorist
at the time of the accident.'31 Thus, Rockingham Casualty's unin-
sured motorist policy would provide coverage for the first
$100,000 of any judgment that Sauder was legally entitled to re-
cover against Ferguson for damages relating to the accident.1
32
Predictably, Sauder filed a complaint against Ferguson seeking
damages arising from the accident.'33 Sauder served Ferguson by
posting at the address listed on the police report-not the address
given by Ferguson at deposition and at trial.' After receiving no
response to the complaint, Sauder then filed a motion for entry of
default judgment against Ferguson.13 Sauder served the motion,
notice of motion, and proposed order on Ferguson by delivery to
his mother at his mother's address.'36 When Ferguson failed to
appear at the hearing, the circuit court entered default judg-
ment."7 Ferguson was personally served with the order entering
judgment by default.'38
The circuit court then set a bench trial on damages, which re-
sulted in an order awarding Sauder $300,000 in damages. 13 The
order also provided that "Rockingham Mutual is liable for its con-









136. Id. at __ 771 S.E.2d at 667.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Ferguson did not appear at this trial. Id.
(Vol. 50:39
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tractual portion of Ms. Sauder's Uninsured Motorist Policy.' 40
Rockingham Mutual then "filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment seeking a determination that Sauder was not legally
entitled to collect the judgment ... because Ferguson was never
served with the summons or complaint and Rockingham Casualty
was never served as required by Code § 38.2-2206(F).,,141 "Thereaf-
ter... Sauder filed a motion to set aside the default judgment
pursuant to Code § 8.01-428(A).'42 Because there "existed some
question" as to whether Ferguson was validly served with pro-
cess, Sauder requested that the circuit court enter an order set-
ting aside the default judgment "out of an abundance of cau-
tion.,143 Upon consideration of the evidence-which included
testimony from Ferguson that he was never served with a com-
plaint or summons-and the arguments of counsel, "the circuit
court denied Sauder's motion to set aside the default judgment.
14
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia explained that the
decision of whether to set aside a judgment by default is well
within the discretion of the circuit court. 1' The court next consid-
ered Sauder's argument that the circuit court abused its discre-
tion in refusing to set aside a default judgment that was void for
lack of personal service of Ferguson.1 46 Importantly, the circuit
court never reached the issue of whether the judgment was
void.147 "Instead, it ruled that the facts did not justify the relief
sought by Sauder.'141 Specifically, the record showed that "Sauder
had knowledge of Ferguson's correct address when she attempted
to serve the complaint and summons on him at a prior address.' 49
When questions about the validity of the service were raised,
140. Id.
141. Id. Sauder had served Rockingham Mutual by personal service on its registered
agent, instead of Rockingham Casualty. Id. at -, 771 S.E.2d at 666. However, both Rock-
ingham Mutual and Rockingham Casualty had the same registered agent. Id. at _, 771
S.E.2d at 667.
142. Id. at__, 771 S.E.2d at 667.
143. Id.
144. Id. at__, 771 S.E.2d at 668.
145. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015) (stating that "the court may
set aside a judgment by default ... ") (emphasis added); VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:19(d)(1) (Repl.
Vol. 2015) (stating that the court may relieve a defendant of a default judgment during the
21-day period provided by Rule 1:1) (emphasis added).
146. Sauder, 289 Va. at -, 771 S.E.2d at 669-70.
147. Id. at-, 771 S.E.2d at 670.
148. Id.
149. Id. at__, 771 S.E.2d at 671.
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Sauder used Ferguson's correct address for service of additional
pleadings.' Sauder then "proceeded to seek and obtain a default
judgment asserting valid service of the complaint and sum-
mons."15' Ultimately, "she obtained a final judgment awarding the
full amount of damages she claimed.""' 2 As the circuit court ob-
served, Sauder was "the architect of [her] own misfortune," and so
the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed."3
E. Necessary Parties
The appeal in Synchronized Construction Services, Inc. v. Pray
Lodging, LLC,"54 is the first of three cases recently decided by the
Supreme Court of Virginia discussing necessary parties. This case
required the court to address the meeting of two different areas of
law: mechanic's lien enforcement actions and necessary party ju-
risprudence.5 The key question before the court was "whether a
general contractor, who has no pecuniary interest in the bond
posted to release the real estate subject to a subcontractor's me-
chanic's lien, is a necessary party to a subcontractor's mechanic's
lien enforcement action.""56
Pray Lodging, LLC entered into a contract with Paris Devel-
opment Group, LLC to serve as construction manager for the con-
struction of a hotel on real estate previously acquired by Prav. 7
As construction manager, Paris had the authority to enter into
agreements with subcontractors in order to accomplish the
work. 5' "Paris entered into several such subcontracts, including a




153. Id. (quoting Landcraft Co. v. Kincaid, 220 Va. 865, 874, 263 S.E.2d 419, 425
(1980)).
154. 288 Va. 356, 764 S.E.2d 61 (2014).
155. Id. at 363, 764 S.E.2d at 64.
156. Id. at 360, 764 S.E.2d at 63.
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Shortly after the project was declared "substantially complete,"
"Synchronized recorded a mechanic's lien for unpaid work.., in
the amount of $208,250.80."'16 Subsequently, "Synchronized filed
a complaint to enforce its mechanic's lien in the Circuit Court of
Orange County, naming Prav, Paris, [Virginia Community Bank
("VCB")], and numerous other subcontractors as defendants.''
"In its complaint, Synchronized asserted a claim.., that Paris
breached its contract with Synchronized by failing to make all
payments due to Synchronized under their subcontract."'162
Paris did not enter an appearance in the case due to the fact
that it no longer existed-the company was dissolved the day af-
ter Synchronized had recorded its mechanic's lien.163 Prav and an-
other defendant then "filed an application to post a bond in the
amount of $237,906.80 in accordance with Code § 43-70.' 164 When
the circuit court granted this application, the real estate that had
been subject to the mechanic's lien was released.'65
Prav then "filed a motion to dismiss the entire complaint on the
basis that Synchronized failed to timely serve numerous defend-
ants.,166 "[T]he circuit court held that Synchronized 'failed to exer-
cise due diligence' to serve Paris within one year of the date of
the filing of the complaint, and therefore dismissed Synchro-
nized's breach of contract claim against Paris.'67 The circuit court
did not, however, dismiss Synchronized's mechanic's lien claim.66
"Later, VCB filed a motion to dismiss the mechanic's lien claim
on the basis that Synchronized failed to timely serve Paris, who,
as the construction manager, was a necessary party to the me-
chanic's lien enforcement action."'69 The circuit court agreed that
Paris was, in fact, a necessary party and therefore dismissed Syn-
chronized's mechanic's lien claim with prejudice.7 '
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 361, 764 S.E.2d at 63-64.
163. Id. at 361, 764 S.E.2d at 64.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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The discussion section of the court's opinion begins with a reci-
tation of the well-established fact that a mechanic's lien is '"a
creature of the statute' allowing for its creation," and so in order
to perfect a mechanic's lien, a party must strictly comply with the
statutory requirements.7' A mechanic's lien enforcement action
"must name all necessary parties within the time set forth by
Code § 43-17," but the Code does not explicitly state which parties
are necessary parties to a mechanic's lien enforcement action.
17
To answer this question, the court relied upon its definition of
"necessary party" in Asch v. Friends of Mt. Vernon Yacht Club.'
Significantly, "[a] mechanic's lien enforcement action seeks to en-
force the mechanic's lien 'against the property bound thereby.)
7 4
And so, a necessary party in such a case is "any party who has a
real property interest in the real estate subject to the mechanic's
lien.''175 The court explained that "the focus is on which parties ac-
tually have a relevant interest in the real property.''7 "Just be-
cause a party may be generally 'interested' in the mechanic's lien
enforcement action ... does not mean that the party is necessary
to the proceedings.
Whether bond is posted impacts the necessary party analysis.'78
If no bond has been posted the inquiry turns upon which parties
have a real property interest in the real estate subject to the me-
chanic's lien, but when a bond is posted the inquiry focuses upon
which parties have a pecuniary interest in the bond itself which is
171. Id. at 363, 764 S.E.2d at 64-65 (quoting Shenandoah Valley R.R. Co. v. Miller, 80
Va. 821, 826 (1885)).
172. Id. at 363, 764 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting Glasser & Glasser, PLC v. Jack Bays, Inc.,
285 Va. 358, 369, 741 S.E.2d 599, 605 (2013)).
173. Id. at 364, 764 S.E. 2d at 65 (citing Asch v. Friends of Mt. Vernon Yacht Club, 251
Va. 89, 90-91, 465 S.E.2d 817, 818 (1996)).
Where an individual is in the actual enjoyment of the subject matter, or has
an interest in it, either in possession or expectancy, which is likely either to
be defeated or diminished by the plaintiffs claim, in such case he has an im-
mediate interest in resisting the demand, and all persons who have such im-
mediate interests are necessary parties to the suit.
Asch, 251 Va. at 90-91, 465 S.E.2d at 818.
174. Synchronized, 288 Va. at 364, 764 S.E.2d at 65 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 43-22
(Repl. Vol. 2013 & Cum. Supp. 2015)).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 365, 764 S.E.2d at 65.
177. Id. at 365, 764 S.E.2d at 65-66.
178. Id. at 365, 764 S.E.2d at 66.
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"likely either to be defeated or diminished" by the plaintiffs "claim
against the bond."'79
The supreme court then addressed certain points raised by the
circuit court, but emphasized that "concerns regarding which par-
ties might be vital to proving the plaintiffs case are not relevant
to the necessary party analysis."'80 Rather, the goal of the neces-
sary party doctrine is "to ensure that all parties central to a dis-
pute can have their interests resolved."'' If a party's only rela-
tionship to a mechanic's lien enforcement action is his status as a
party to a contract, then he or she "has only a general pecuniary
interest in the outcome of a mechanic's lien enforcement ac-
tion."'82 "[S]uch a general, tangential interest is insufficient to el-
evate a party to necessary party status.'8 3
Applying these principles, the court then considered whether
Paris was a necessary party.' Notably, Paris was "neither the
principal nor the surety on the bond," and it had "no ability to be
awarded a judgment to be paid out from the bond."'8 5 Although
Paris acquired a mechanic's lien on the real estate by virtue of
the fact that it provided services for the construction of the hotel,
Paris failed to perfect its mechanic's lien.8' Therefore, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that the circuit court could "render
'complete relief in Synchronized's mechanic's lien enforcement
action, even in Paris' absence, because Paris' lack of a pecuniary
interest in the posted bond mean[t] that there [was] no monetary
claim upon which the circuit court could award judgment in favor
of Paris .... ,, "' "Paris, as the general contractor, [was] a proper
party but not a necessary party to [the] subcontractor's mechan-
ic's lien enforcement action."'8 Thus, the circuit court's judgment
was reversed and remanded.8 '
179. Id. (quoting George W. Kane, Inc. v. Nuscope, Inc., 243 Va. 503, 509, 416 S.E.2d
701, 705 (1992)).
180. Id. at 366, 764 S.E.2d at 66.
181. Id. at 366, 764 S.E.2d at 67.
182. Id. at 367, 764 S.E.2d at 67.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 368, 764 S.E.2d at 67.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 368, 764 S.E.2d at 68.
187. Id. at 368-69, 764 S.E.2d at 68.
188. Id. at 369, 764 S.E.2d at 68.
189. Id.
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The issue of necessary parties arose again in Frace v. John-
son.'9 In May 2013, a Fairfax County Code Compliance Investiga-
tor responded to multiple anonymous complaints concerning the
property of Sheila E. Frace."' The investigator subsequently is-
sued a Notice of Violation.19 Frace contested the Notice of Viola-
tion in a hearing before the Board of Zoning Appeals of Fairfax
County ("BZA"), but the BZA upheld the violation determination
of the Zoning Administrator.'93 Frace then filed a petition for writ
of certiorari in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County pursuant to
Virginia Code section 15.2-2314, which allows a person
"aggrieved by any decision of the board of zoning appeals" to seek
judicial review in the appropriate circuit court within thirty days
of the BZA's final decision.9 Although the style of Frace's petition
referenced the decision of the BZA, she did not name the Board of
Supervisors, or any other party, in her petition.' "[Tlhe Zoning
Administrator filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Code § 15.2-
2314 made the Board of Supervisors a necessary party to the pro-
ceeding."'196 The circuit court agreed, stating that section 15.2-
2314 is "crystal clear that the governing body is a necessary party
to the proceeding."'97
On appeal, Frace asserted that the circuit court erred because
she had styled the petition precisely as required by section 15.2-
2314 and that she should have been permitted to add the Board
of Supervisors as a party to the proceeding even after the thirty-
day statutory period had run.99
The court explained that section 15.2-2314 prescribes the prop-
er styling of the petition and explicitly requires the inclusion of
the board of supervisors of a county as a necessary party to the
proceedings.199 The court concluded that compliance with the styl-
190. 289 Va. 198, 768 S.E.2d 427 (2015).
191. Id. at 198, 768 S.E.2d at 428.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 199, 768 S.E.2d at 428.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 199, 768 S.E.2d at 428-29.
199. Id. at 200-02, 768 S.E.2d at 429-30. Section 15.2-2314 also clearly signals that
boards of zoning appeals are not necessary parties to certiorari proceedings. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-2314 (Cum. Supp. 2015). Rather, the governing body with an interest in de-
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ing requirement, alone, is not sufficient to obtain judicial review
under section 15.2-2314.200 The aggrieved party must also name
the governing body as a necessary party in the body of the peti-
tion.2°'
Most recently, a discussion of necessary parties appeared in the
Supreme Court of Virginia's opinion in Marble Technologies, Inc.
v. Mallon, which primarily dealt with whether an easement
across certain waterfront property in Hampton was static in loca-
tion (in which case it was now under water) or moved in relation
to the high water line."2 However, as the easement in issue was
created in 1936 and involved numerous parcels, a substantial is-
sue was presented in simply collecting all the parties in interest
before the court.03 The opinion recites that leave was granted on
numerous occasions and trial continued at least once to permit
joinder of additional parties.2"4 The defendant sought an addition-
al continuance to permit joinder of additional parties." This re-
quest was refused and the trial proceeded notwithstanding that
the parties stipulated that not all successors in interest to the
original conveyance had been joined.2"'
On appeal, the defendant assigned as error the trial court's de-
cision to proceed in the absence of all necessary parties.7 The
Supreme Court of Virginia acknowledged that as a general propo-
sition, "[a]ll persons interested in the subject matter of a suit and
to be affected by its results are necessary parties" and
"[g]enerally, a court should only decide a case on its merits if all
necessary parties are before it. 208 However, the supreme court
went on to state that failure to join all necessary parties does not
fending zoning ordinances is the Board of Supervisors. Frace, 289 Va. at 201, 768 S.E.2d
at 429-30. Moreover, the thirty-day filing requirement is a statutory prerequisite to en-
sure that the proper parties have notice and an opportunity to protect their interests be-
fore a circuit court may exercise its subject matter jurisdiction. Frace, 289 Va. at 201-02,
768 S.E.2d at 430.
200. Frace, 289 Va. at 202, 768 S.E.2d at 430.
201. Id.
202. 289 Va. -, 773 S.E.2d 155 (2015).
203. See id. at__, 773 S.E.2d at 156-57.
204. Id.
205. Id. at_, 773 S.E.2d at 157.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. (quoting Michael E. Siska Revocable Trust v. Milestone Dev., LLC, 282 Va.
169, 173, 715 S.E.2d 21, 23 (2011)).
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implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and, im-
portantly, that the decision to proceed without joinder of all nec-
essary parties will be reviewed on an abuse-of-discretion basis."9
Noting the numerous instances of leave having been granted to
permit joinder of additional parties, the numerous parties before
the court, and that it would be "practically impossible" to join all
parties potentially affected, the supreme court found that the
lower court did not abuse its discretion.210
F. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction was the first of two central issues discussed in the
court's opinion in DRHI, Inc. v. Hanback, an action brought by
the purchaser, DRHI, Inc., against the vendor, William W. Han-
back, Jr., for specific performance of a land purchase agree-
ment.21' DRHI alleged that Hanback had received a better offer
from a third party and, for that reason, had refused to confirm in
writing that he would honor the purchase contract and sell the
property to DRHI.
212
In his answer and grounds of defense, Hanback admitted to en-
tering into the land purchase contract with DRHI, "but he argued
that DRHI failed to perform certain terms of the contract," ren-
dering it void.212 The trial court entered a decree (the "Order")
which provided, in part:
At the time of settlement, DRHI, Inc. shall pay to Mr. Hanback
$400,000 minus the $10,000 already paid, and.., at the time any
subdivision plans submitted by DRHI, Inc. for the development of
the property sold by Mr. Hanback are approved by the City of Fair-
fax, in the event that the plans submitted by DRHI, Inc. permit the
construction of six or more individual residences, DRHI, Inc. shall
pay to Mr. Hanback $70,000 for the sixth lot and $70,000 for each• . 214
additional approved 
lot.
More than eight years later, Hanback filed a petition for rule to
show cause, in which he asserted that "after closing on his prop-
erty in 2004, DRHI purchased an adjoining property and de-
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. 288 Va. 249, 765 S.E.2d 9 (2014).
212. Id. at 249, 765 S.E.2d at 10.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 249-50, 765 S.E.2d at 10.
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signed an integrated development plan combining the two par-
cels" and creating fifteen lots. 215 In his petition, Hanback asserted
that as soon as he became aware of this development, he contact-
ed DRHI and requested the $70,000 per lot that was owed to him
pursuant to the Order.2 6 When DRHI refused to pay, Hanback
asked the trial court to issue the rule to show cause and hold
DRHI in contempt of court.217 After an evidentiary hearing and
further proceedings on the show cause, the circuit court entered
an order finding DRHI in contempt of the Order.218 Further, the
court entered judgment against DRHI in the amount of
$350,000-the outstanding amount owed under the Order."9
DRHI filed a notice of appeal to both the Court of Appeals of
Virginia and to the Supreme Court of Virginia.2 ' One of the cen-
tral questions posed in both appeals was whether the Order re-
quiring "that DRHI pay Hanback $350,000 constituted a mone-
tary judgment, a civil contempt fine, or both. 21' Because the
answer to this question was not immediately apparent, the court
determined that in the interests of judicial economy it would
grant DRHI's petition for appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia
and certify the case before the Court of Appeals of Virginia pur-
suant to Virginia Code sections 17.1-409(A) and -409(B)(2).222
As the court explained, the power to certify an appeal from the
court of appeals lies within the discretion of the supreme court 2
Although the court rarely exercises this discretion, when it does
so, the effect of the certification is to transfer jurisdiction to the
supreme court over the entire case, regardless of the outcome on
the merits.224
The second issue considered by the court in this case was
"whether the trial court abused its discretion when it held DRHI
in contempt and awarded the compensatory fine to Hanback."'22




219. Id. at 251, 765 S.E.2d at 11.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 253, 765 S.E.2d at 11-12.
222. Id. at 253, 765 S.E.2d at 12.
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The Court ruled that the Order "was not an enforceable judgment
in favor of Hanback, and no finite amount of damages was identi-
fied." '226 Rather, the additional amount DRHI might owe to Han-
back was contingent upon numerous factors that, at the time of
the entry of the Order, had not yet occurred.227
Citing to a line of cases previously decided by the court ad-
dressing contempt proceedings, the court clarified that contempt
only lies "for disobedience of what is decreed, not for what may be
decreed."'228 Further, in order for a person to be held in contempt
for violating a court order, the order must be in definite terms
and the command must be expressed (not implied).229 Because the
Order "did not contain definite terms as to the total amount
DRHI was required to pay and when such payment was due,
DRHI could not be held in contempt for failing" to comply with
the Order.23° Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the
circuit court.231
The issue of jurisdiction arose again in City of Danville v. Tate,
a case involving an action by the City against a retired firefighter,
0. Ryland Tate, seeking recovery of Tate's sick leave pay.22 Tate
had worked as a firefighter for the City for thirty-nine years
when he suffered a heart attack that left him unable to return to
his job.233 When Tate retired, the City paid him the equivalent of
his full wages in the form of sick leave pay totaling approximately
$40,000.234 Under the City's retirement system, Tate elected to
use the balance of his accrued sick leave to obtain an extra year of
credit towards his retirement.2 35 "With this election, the City elim-
inated Tate's sick leave balance as provided for under its poli-
cies.236
226. Id. at 255, 765 S.E.2d at 13.
227. Id.
228. Id. (quoting Petrosinelli v. PETA, 273 Va. 700, 706-07, 643 S.E.2d 151, 154
(2007)).
229. Id. (citing Petrosinelli, 273 Va. at 707, 643 S.E.2d at 154-55).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 289 Va. 1, 766 S.E.2d 900 (2015).
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In addition, before retiring, Tate filed a workers' compensation
claim seeking indemnity benefits based upon his heart attack-
related disability.2 3 "[Tihe City paid indemnity benefits to Tate
for his six-month period of disability pursuant to a Virginia
Workers' Compensation Commission ... award.2 3' Notably, "the
City did not request from the Commission a credit under Code §
65.2-520 against this award for the sick leave payments that the
City made to Tate during the same disability period.2 39
Upon realizing that Tate had been paid twice, the City filed an
action against Tate seeking recovering of his sick leave pay."' The
City alleged that "Tate was not entitled to receive both sick leave
pay and workers' compensation indemnity benefits for the same
disability period."'241 After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the
circuit court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to decide
the City's claim, and thus it dismissed the complaint.242
On appeal, the City argued that the circuit court erred because
the court did, in fact, have jurisdiction to decide the claim.
243
While the Supreme Court of Virginia agreed with the City's juris-
dictional argument, it disagreed on the merits.2 4
The court explained that under the Virginia Workers' Compen-
sation Act, the Commission may decide whether to credit an em-
ployer's sick leave pay.245 However, the Commission's jurisdiction
is limited to only those issues directly relating to the right of an
employee to workers' compensation for a work-related injury.2 6
While section 65.2-520 authorizes an employer to request a credit,
it does not mandate that the employer do so.'27 Thus, in a case
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1, 766 S.E.2d at 901-02.
239. Id. at 1, 766 S.E.2d at 902. Virginia Code section 65.2-520 provides, in pertinent
part: "Any payments made by the employer to the injured employee during the period of
his disability ... which by the terms of this title were not due and payable when made,
may, subject to the approval of the Commission, be deducted from the amount to be paid
as compensation..." VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-520 (Repl. Vol. 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2015).






246. Id. at 2-3, 766 S.E.2d at 902 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 3 Va. App.
116, 120, 348 S.E.2d 416, 418 (1986)).
247. Id. at 3, 766 S.E.2d at 902.
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such as this where the employer did not request a credit, section
65.2-520 is simply not triggered.248 As a result, "[t]he Commission
had no jurisdiction to decide this dispute ....
Nevertheless, the supreme court ruled that the circuit court
reached the right result in dismissing the City's complaint be-
cause the City did not have authority to recover sick leave pay
from Tate.25' Rather, the recovery authorized by the pertinent or-
dinance and regulations relates to a claim by the City against an
employee's workers' compensation benefits.25' Here, the City was
"seeking to recover Tate's sick leave payments, not his workers'
compensation payments."'252 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court.2 3
G. Sanctions
The supreme court's opinion in EE Mart F. C., L.L. C. v. Delyon
addresses a dispute surrounding the circuit court's calculation of
attorney's fees.254 EE Mart F.C., L.L.C. owned and operated a gro-
cery store in Merrifield, Virginia.255 Suzanne Delyon is the former
chief financial officer of EE Mart and owner of multiple other lim-
ited liability companies.256
EE Mart brought an action against Delyon and her other LLCs
alleging wrongful conversion, among other claims.2 57 All of the
claims related to insurance proceeds paid by Traveler's Insurance
Company to Delyon.258 "On the eve of trial, EE Mart nonsuited the
case."'59 Shortly thereafter, "EE Mart brought an action against
Traveler's in the Circuit Court of Carroll County, Maryland...
related to Traveler's payment of the insurance proceeds to
248. Id.
249. Id. at 3, 766 S.E.2d at 903.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 4, 766 S.E.2d at 903.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. 289 Va. 282, 768 S.E.2d 430 (2015).
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Delyon.,,26" Traveler's removed the case to federal court, but it was
eventually transferred back to the circuit court in Maryland."'
Delyon and the other LLCs then filed an action in Fairfax
County Circuit Court "seeking to enjoin EE Mart from proceeding
with the Maryland [a]ction and seeking [a] declaratory judgment
that the Maryland [a]ction was without merit.2 62 "EE Mart filed a
counterclaim against Deylon and the [o]ther LLCs, reasserting
the same claims it had pled in [its] [o]riginal [a]ction."'263 "In their
answer to the counterclaim, Delyon and the other LLCs sought
sanctions under Code § 8.01-271.1 on the [basis] that the asser-
tions in the counterclaim were frivolous and based on false
statements."2 4
When EE Mart failed to file exhibit and witness lists and did
not participate in pretrial activities, the circuit court determined
that EE Mart had abandoned its counterclaim.2 65 The court then
entered an order dismissing the counterclaim, finding it to be
"frivolous and without support in law or fact.,266 Given this ruling,
Delyon and the other LLCs made an oral motion for sanctions
against EE Mart, claiming that the original action and the Mary-
land action, in addition to the counterclaim, were frivolous.
26 7
"[Tihey sought the total amount of attorney's fees that they had
expended in defending against" all three cases.268 "Relying on
Code § 8.01-271.1, the trial court granted the motion and award-
ed $25,550 in attorney's fees. '269 EE Mart, with new counsel, filed
a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the circuit
court.27° An appeal to the supreme court followed.27'
On appeal, EE Mart argued that the trial court's decision to
award $25,550 in attorney's fees was an abuse of discretion be-
cause "the sanctions award included attorney's fees that Delyon
260. Id.
261. Id. at 284, 768 S.E.2d at 431-32.
262. Id. at 284, 768 S.E.2d at 432.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 284-85, 768 S.E.2d at 432.








UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
and the [o]ther LLCs had incurred in suits that pre-dated the fil-
ing of the [p]resent [a]ction or were tried in other jurisdictions."'72
In other words, EE Mart argued that the circuit court had "ex-
ceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction.""27 Of significance is the fact
that EE Mart did not assign error to the fact that sanctions were
awarded-it only assigned error to the calculation of the attor-
ney's fees.274
Interpreting section 8.01-271.1, the supreme court held that
the trial court erred in its calculation of the attorney's fees it
could award as a sanction.2 7 ' The "authority to award sanctions
under Code § 8.01-271.1 is triggered by the filing of a pleading,
motion, or other paper," thus "the clear implication is that the fil-
ing or making of the motion must occur in the same action and
same court that subsequently awards the sanctions.2 7 6 "To hold
otherwise would contravene the finality guaranteed by Rule
1:1.,,277 In this case, the sanctions award improperly "included at-
torney's fees that were not 'incurred because of any filing or mo-
tion made in the [p]resent [a]ction.'27s
H. Foreign Subpoenas
Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc. involved a defama-
tion suit filed by Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc. against three
John Doe defendants.9 In its complaint, Hadeed alleged that the
defendants "falsely represented themselves as Hadeed customers
and posted negative reviews regarding Hadeed's carpet cleaning
services on Yelp"-a social media website "that allows registered
users to rate and describe their experiences with local business-
es.
28 °
272. Id. at 285-86, 768 S.E.2d at 432.
273. Id. at 285, 768 S.E.2d at 432.
274. Id. at 286, 768 S.E.2d at 432.
275. Id. at 287, 768 S.E.2d at 433.
276. Id. at 286, 768 S.E.2d at 433.
277. Id. Rule 1:1 provides that "[a]ll final judgments, orders, and decrees ... shall re-
main under the control of the trial court and subject to be modified, vacated, or suspended
for twenty-one days after the date of entry, and no longer." VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:1 (Repl. Vol.
2015).
278. EE Mart F.C., 289 Va. at 287, 768 S.E.2d at 433.
279. 289 Va. __, 770 S.E.2d 440 (2015).
280. Id. at_, 770 S.E.2d at 441.
[Vol. 50:39
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
During the course of the litigation, "Hadeed issued a subpoena
duces tecum to Yelp, seeking documents revealing the identity...
[of] the authors of the reviews.' 8' Such information is stored on
administrative databases accessible only by Yelp's "user opera-
tions team" located in San Francisco.282 Yelp has no offices in Vir-
ginia, but does have a designated registered agent for service of
process in Virginia-upon whom Hadeed served the subpoena du-
ces tecum.28 'Yelp filed written objections to the subpoena duces
tecum," and subsequently, "Hadeed moved to overrule the objec-
tions and enforce the subpoena duces tecum.,2 14 "The circuit court
issued an order enforcing the subpoena duces tecum.'28 Further,
the circuit court held Yelp in civil contempt when it refused to
comply with the order.2 11 "The Court of Appeals [of Virginia] af-
firmed the circuit court's decision.2 7
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered "whether
the circuit court was empowered to enforce the subpoena duces
tecum against Yelp."2 In addressing this question, the court first
distinguished between personal jurisdiction and the exercise of
subpoena power.288 "[W]hile the General Assembly has expressly
provided for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants under certain circumstances, it has not expressly pro-
vided for the exercise of subpoena power over nonresident non-
parties.' Moreover, the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia
"do not recognize the existence of subpoena power over nonresi-










290. Id. Virginia's long-arm statute sets forth a range of options for the manner in
which nonresident defendants may be served when "exercise of personal jurisdiction is au-
thorized by this chapter." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-329(A) (Repl. Vol. 2015). However, "the
General Assembly has not expressly authorized the exercise of subpoena power over non-
parties who do not reside in Virginia." Yelp, Inc., 289 Va. at __, 770 S.E.2d at 443.
291. Yelp, Inc., 289 Va. at__, 770 S.E.2d at 443. While Rule 4:9A does detail the proce-
dure for issuing a subpoena duces tecum to a non-party, it does not address the issuance of
one for documents located outside the Commonwealth. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:9A (Repl. Vol.
2015).
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General Assembly's authorization of the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction over nonresident defendants does not confer upon Vir-
ginia courts subpoena power over nonresident non-parties.292 Af-
ter all, "the power to compel a nonresident non-party to produce
documents in Virginia" is not related in any way to the "consider-
ation of whether the nonresident non-party would be subject
to ... personal jurisdiction" if named in a lawsuit.23 These are
two separate and distinct issues.294 For these reasons, the court
"vacat[ed] the judgment of the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals, vacat[ed] the
contempt order of the circuit court, and remand[ed] [the case] for
further proceedings ....
I. Prejudgment Interest
In Devine v. Buki, Donald Devine appealed "the judgment of
the trial court rescinding the sale of property known as Rock Hall
to Charles Z. Buki... and Kimberly A. Marsho ... .,,296 Devine al-
so "appeal[ed] the trial court's award of consequential damages
and attorney's fees.,29" Among the many issues that the Court
considered on appeal was Devine's contention "that the trial court
erred in awarding prejudgment interest because Buki and Mar-
sho failed to specifically request it in their pleadings.29s
Virginia Code section 8.01-382 authorizes a trial court to award
prejudgment interest, and the decision to do so is in the discretion
of the fact-finder.299 "However, although the award of prejudg-
ment interest is discretionary, it is still 'part of the actual damag-
es sought to be recovered.""'3 ° Therefore, prejudgment interest,
like other damages, must be specifically pled before it can be
292. Yelp, Inc., 289 Va. at__, 770 S.E.2d at 443.
293. Id.
294. Id. at__, 770 S.E.2d at 446.
295. Id.
296. 289 Va. 162, 166, 767 S.E.2d 459, 461 (2015).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 179, 767 S.E.2d at 468.
299. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-382 (Repl. Vol. 2015) ("In any ... action at law or suit in
equity, the final order, verdict of the jury, or if no jury the judgment or decree of the court,
may provide for interest on any principal sum awarded, or any part thereof, and fix the
period at which the interest shall commence.").
300. Devine, 289 Va. at 179, 767 S.E.2d at 468 (quoting Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Douthat,
248 Va. 627, 631, 449 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1994)).
[Vol. 50:39
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
awarded by a trial court."1 In this case, the relevant complaint
contained no request for prejudgment interest, and thus the trial
court erred in awarding prejudgment interest.3 2
J. Plea in Bar, Burden of Proof, Damages
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed a host of civil proce-
dure issues in Smith v. McLaughlin, an appeal arising from a le-
gal malpractice claim.0 3 It is well known that a typical "legal
malpractice claim involves a case within the case, because the...
plaintiff must establish how the attorney's negligence in the un-
derlying litigation proximately caused [his or her] damages.3 4
This case involved yet another layer-"the underlying litigation
in which the alleged malpractice occurred was itself a legal mal-
practice claim."3 5 So this was "a case (the initial criminal matter)
within a case (the criminal malpractice matter) within [a] case
(the legal malpractice matter [before the court]).""3 6
When Bruce McLaughlin was charged with multiple counts of
felony sexual abuse, he hired William J. Schewe of the firm Gra-
ham & Schewe, and Harvey J. Volzer of the firm Shaughnessy,
Volzer & Gagner, P.C. to represent him in the criminal matter.3 7
"At the conclusion of trial, the jury found McLaughlin guilty...
and [he] was sentenced to serve [thirteen] years in prison.
''
08
Shortly after learning that his direct appeal had been denied,
"McLaughlin attempted to escape from custody by running from
the courthouse, but [he] was quickly apprehended.'" 30 9 He pled
guilty to the felony of simple escape and was sentenced to five
years in prison."o
301. Id.
302. Id. The supreme court explained that it is well-established that "a plaintiff cannot
recover more than he sues for." Id. (quoting Powell v. Sears, 23] Va. 464, 470, 344 S.E.2d
916, 919 (1986)).
303. 289 Va. 241, 769 S.E.2d 7 (2015).
304. Id. at 248, 769 S.E.2d at 10.
305. Id. at 248, 769 S.E.2d at 10-11.
306. Id. at 248, 769 S.E.2d at 11.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 249, 769 S.E.2d at 11.
310. Id.
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"Pursuant to habeas proceedings, McLaughlin's convictions for
the felony sexual abuse charges were vacated and he was granted
a new trial."31' At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury found
McLaughlin not guilty on all charges."2 By that time, "McLaugh-
lin had been incarcerated for over four years.3 3
McLaughlin hired Brian Shevlin of the firm Shevlin Smith to
pursue a criminal malpractice claim against his criminal defense
attorneys Schewe, Volzer, and their respective law firms.34 The
criminal malpractice claim alleged that the defense attorneys had
failed to obtain and review taped interviews of the alleged vic-
tims.315 Shevlin Smith negotiated a settlement and release with
Schewe and the firm Graham & Schewe, settling the criminal
malpractice claim against them for $50,000. 3'6 The release agree-
ment "did not discharge McLaughlin's criminal malpractice claim
against Volzer and the firm Shaughnessy, Volzer & Gagner,
P.C..
317
Approximately four months after Shevlin Smith executed the
release agreement, the supreme court issued its opinion in Cox v.
Geary.3 s "Based on one of the holdings in that case, Volzer and
the firm Shaughnessy, Volzer & Gagner, P.C. filed a plea in bar
to McLaughlin's criminal malpractice claim. ,3 19 "Volzer and the
firm argued that [the] malpractice claim against them must be
dismissed because," according to the Cox ruling, "the settlement
and release of some co-defendants to the legal malpractice
claim ... was a release of all co-defendants.,32" The trial court







316. Id. at 249-50, 769 S.E.2d at 11. Graham & Shewe's malpractice insurer provided
$50,000 to the firm to handle the criminal malpractice matter or settle the case. Id. at 249,
769 S.E.2d at 11.
317. Id. at 250, 769 S.E.2d at 11. The release agreement was entered into pursuant to
Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1. Id.
318. 271 Va. 131, 624 S.E.2d 16 (2006).
319. Smith, 289 Va. at 250, 769 S.E.2d at 11.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 250, 769 S.E.2d at 11-12.
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After his criminal malpractice claim was dismissed, McLaugh-
lin filed a legal malpractice suit against Shevlin Smith alleging,
among other things, that "Shevlin Smith breached its duty to
McLaughlin by failing to foresee how [the] holding in Cox would
impact the Release Agreement."'322 The legal malpractice case
eventually went to trial, and "the jury found Shevlin Smith liable
to McLaughlin ... in the amount of $5.75 million."3 '3 "Shevlin
Smith... filed a petition for appeal with [the supreme court] .
The first assignment of error addressed by the court was
whether the circuit court erred in failing to sustain Shevlin
Smith's second plea in bar and by rejecting his position that an
attorney does not commit malpractice by failing to anticipate a
change in the law. The court held that the trial court's refusal
to sustain the plea in bar was in error.3 2 6
In reaching this holding, the court first explained "that a plea
in bar 'constitutes [either] a complete defense to the [complaint],
or to that part of the [complaint] to which it is pleaded.'327 In oth-
er words, "a plea in bar can be sustained even if it presents a bar
to recovery to only some, but not all, of the plaintiffs claims."'328
Shevlin Smith's plea in bar presented only a partial bar to
McLaughlin's recovery; yet, even so, the circuit court had the abil-
ity to rule on those issues."'
The circuit court also denied Shevlin Smith's plea in bar on the
basis that "whether Shevlin Smith breached its duty to McLaugh-
lin was a question of fact to be decided by a jury. ,3" The court
found that this ruling was also error.331 And so, on appeal, the
court considered whether Shevlin Smith breached its duty to
McLaughlin by failing to correctly anticipate a judicial ruling on
132
an unsettled legal issue. Citing to decisions of courts in other
322. Id. at 250, 769 S.E.2d at 12.




327. Id. at 252, 769 S.E.2d at 13 (quoting Campbell v. Johnson, 203 Va. 43, 47, 122 S.E.
2d 907, 910 (1961)).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 253, 769 S.E.2d at 13.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 253, 769 S.E.2d at 13.
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jurisdictions, the court discussed the "judgmental immunity
rule."'33 Although the court declined to adopt this rule per se, it
held that its application was instructive in this case.334 The court
stated that "[a]llowing an attorney to be liable in malpractice for
simply failing to correctly predict the outcome of an unsettled le-
gal issue unduly burdens the practice of law, which does a disser-
vice to the profession, and hampers the development of the law,
which does a disservice to the public."'335 Applying traditional
standard of care principles, "an attorney's reasonable but imper-
fect judgment regarding an unsettled legal issue does not give
rise to liability." '36
[I]f an attorney exercises a "reasonable degree of care, skill, and dis-
patch" while acting in an unsettled area of the law, which is to be
evaluated in the context of "the state of the law at the time" of the al-
leged negli ence, then the attorney does not breach the duty owed to
the client.
Thus, "Shevlin Smith did not breach its duty by failing to correct-
ly anticipate a judicial ruling on an unsettled legal issue."'' As a
matter of law, the court held that "Shevlin Smith did not breach
its duty to McLaughlin by failing to correctly anticipate [the]
holding in Cox."33 Thus, the court reversed the circuit court's
judgment in denying Shevlin Smith's plea in bar.34 °
Because "the jury was incorrectly permitted to find Shevlin
Smith negligent on the evidence introduced at trial supporting
the theory that Shevlin Smith breached its duty by failing to cor-
rectly anticipate [the] holding in Cox," the court "revers[ed] the
circuit court's order affirming the jury's award finding Shevlin
333. Id. at 254, 769 S.E.2d at 13-14.
334. Id. at 254, 769 S.E.2d at 14.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 254-55, 769 S.E.2d at 14.
337. Id. at 255, 769 S.E.2d at 14. (quoting Ripper v. Bain, 253 Va. 197, 202, 482 S.E.2d
832, 836 (1997); Heyward & Lee Const. Co. v. Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, 249 Va.
54, 57, 453 S.E.2d 270, 272 (1995)).
338. Id. at 257, 769 S.E.2d at 15. "At the time the Release Agreement was executed in
2005, the General Assembly had modified [the] common law rule in Code § 8.01-35.1... so
that settlement with and release of one co-tortfeasor did not release other co-tortfeasors."
Id. at 255, 769 S.E.2d at 14. Given the jurisprudence in existence at the time of execution,
Shevlin Smith acted with a "reasonable degree of care, skill, and dispatch" when operating
in an unsettled area of law. Id. at 255, 769 S.E.2d at 15. (quoting Ripper, 253 Va. at 202,
482 S.E.2d at 836).
339. Id. at 257, 769 S.E.2d at 15.
340. Id.
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Smith liable to McLaughlin, and vacat[ed] that award.""34 The
court then went on to address additional issues presented on ap-
peal that were likely to arise on remand.842
The next assignment of error that the court addressed was
whether "[t]he circuit court erred in permitting [McLaughlin] to
recover more in [the legal malpractice] action than he could have
collected from [Schewe, Volzer, and their respective law firms] in
the absence of Shevlin Smith's alleged malpractice.""3 The court
disagreed with McLaughlin's contention that collectability is ir-
relevant to legal malpractice claims.4 The court went on to hold
that "the burden of pleading and disproving collectibility [is] on
the negligent attorney as an affirmative defense," not on the legal
malpractice plaintiff.4 5
The court next considered whether non-pecuniary, non-
economic damages, such as pain and suffering, are recoverable in
a legal malpractice claim.4 McLaughlin assigned error to the cir-
cuit court's ruling that non-economic damages were unavailable
to him, but the supreme court affirmed this ruling.347 As the court
explained, "[t]he question of what damages are recoverable in a
legal malpractice claim is... governed by [the] law pertaining to
what damages are recoverable in a breach of contract claim.34s
Because non-pecuniary injury is not recoverable in a breach of
contract claim, it follows that non-pecuniary damages are not re-
coverable in a legal malpractice claim.49 Instead, "[a] legal mal-
341. Id. at 259, 796 S.E.2d at 16.
342. Id. at 259, 769 S.E.2d at 17.
343. Id. at 259-60, 769 S.E.2d at 17.
344. Id. at 261, 769 S.E.2d at 17.
345. Id. at 262-63, 769 S.E.2d at 18.
346. Id. at 263-267, 769 S.E.2d at 19-21.
347. Id. at 263-64, 769 S.E.2d at 19.
348. Id. at 265, 769 S.E.2d at 19. "[T]he duty that an attorney must 'exercise a reason-
able degree of care, skill, and dispatch in rendering the services for which the attorney
was employed,' . . . does not arise in tort, but is [a] duty arising from the attorney-client
'contractual' relationship ...." Id. at 264, 769 S.E.2d at 19 (quoting Cox v. Geary, 271 Va.
141, 152, 624 S.E.2d 16, 22 (2006); Ripper v. Bain, 253 Va. 197, 202-03, 482 S.E.2d 832,
836 (1997)). Thus, any damage to be recovered by operation of Virginia Code section 54.1-
3906 is contract damage. Id.
349. Id. at 265-66, 769 S.E.2d at 20.
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practice plaintiff may recover only pecuniary damages proximate-
ly caused by an attorney's breach of the contractually implied du-
ties. 35°
Lastly, the supreme court considered whether the circuit court
erred in allowing McLaughlin, in both his opening statement and
closing argument, to ask for millions more in damages than his
ad damnum clause alleged.3 '1 As pled in the ad damnum clause of
his legal malpractice complaint, McLaughlin sought $6 million in
damages.352 Yet during his opening and closing, McLaughlin's
counsel requested approximately $10 million in damages from the
jury.33 "[T]he circuit court overruled Shevlin Smiths' objections to
[the] $10 million request.'354 The supreme court determined that
this was error, as "a plaintiff may not request from the jury, in ei-
ther opening statement or closing argument, an amount of dam-
ages that exceeds the amount of the plaintiffs ad damnum.3 5
K. Punitive Damages
The Supreme Court of Virginia provided some instructive
commentary regarding jury instructions generally, and regarding
punitive damages in particular, in Cain v. Lee.356 The case arose
in the context of an automobile accident involving an intoxicated
driver.37 The defendant requested and obtained a jury instruction
on punitive damages as follows: "Punitive damages are generally
not favored and should be awarded only in cases involving egre-
gious conduct."'358 The court noted that this language was "taken
directly" out of the court's opinion in Xspedius Management Co. of
Virginia, LLC v. Stephan."' Notwithstanding this fact, the court
held the instruction improper and reversed the case.360 In so do-
350. Id. at 266, 769 S.E.2d at 20.
351. Id. at 269, 769 S.E.2d at 22.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 270, 769 S.E.2d at 22.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. 289 Va.,... 772 S.E.2d 894, 896-97 (2015).
357. Id. at-, 772 S.E.2d at 895.
358. Id. at-, 772 S.E.2d at 896.
359. Id. at _, 772 S.E.2d at 897 (citing Xspedius Mgmt. Co. of Va., LLC v. Stephan,
269 Va. 421, 425, 611 S.E.2d 385, 387 (2005)).
360. Id. at _, 772 S.E.2d at 896, 898.
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ing, the court admonished against "the danger of the indiscrimi-
nate use of language from appellate opinions in a jury instruc-
tion."" ' Focusing on the language here, the court characterized it
as 'argumentative language' about legal matters that is inappro-
priate for consideration by the jury."'362
L. Authority to Enter a Decree of Sale
In CVAS 2, LLC v. City of Fredericksburg, the court considered
whether the circuit court "had authority to enter a decree of sale
of real estate pursuant to [the City's] suit to collect delinquent re-
al estate taxes and delinquent special assessments."3"3 CVAS 2's
petition for appeal contained a single assignment of error: "[t]he
trial court erred in its construction of Virginia Code §§ 15.2-5158
and 58.1-3965(A) by ordering the sale of CVAS 2's real estate
when [the] taxes were less than two years delinquent."'364
CVAS 2 owns real estate in the city of Fredericksburg, and "the
City ha[d] levied that real estate with taxes.365 The local govern-
ing body levied the real estate with special assessments for the
benefit of the Celebrate Virginia South Community Development
Authority ("CDA"). 366 CVAS 2 had "outstanding real estate taxes
dating back to the 2012 fiscal year, and [had] outstanding special
assessments dating back to the 2009 fiscal year.""3 7 The City
brought suit against CVAS 2 on June 13, 2013, seeking to have
CVAS 2's real estate sold in order to collect the real estate taxes
and special assessments owed by CVAS 2.3
In response to the City's complaint and motion for decree of
sale, CVAS 2 filed a motion to dismiss, in which it asserted that
the City failed to comply with Virginia Code section 58.1-3965,
and therefore the property could not be sold "to recover the delin-
361. Id. at __, 772 S.E.2d at 897 (quoting Blondel v. Hays, 241 Va. 467, 474, 403 S.E.2d
340, 344 (1991)).
362. Id. (quoting Abernathy v. Emporia Manufacturing Co., 122 Va. 406, 413, 95 S.E.
418, 420 (1918)).
363. 289 Va. 100, 107, 766 S.E.2d 912, 913 (2015).
364. Id. at 108, 766 S.E.2d at 914.
365. Id. at 107, 766 S.E.2d at 913.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 107, 766 S.E.2d at 913-14.
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quent real estate taxes and special assessments.,369 After a hear-
ing on the matter, the circuit court entered a decree of sale order-
ing that the real estate be sold to pay "the taxes, penalties, inter-
est, special assessments, fees, costs, and any liens whatever
thereon."' CVAS 2's appeal followed."'
The court's opinion first addressed the City's motion to dismiss
CVAS 2's appeal on the grounds that "the circuit court's entry of
the decree of sale was not a final order giving rise to [the supreme
court's] jurisdiction under Code § 8.01-670(A).'72 The court dis-
pensed with this issue quickly, explaining that the decree of sale
was "an interlocutory decree in a case on an equitable claim," and
that the court has jurisdiction to resolve appeals from interlocu-
tory orders "requiring ... title of property to be changed.' 73 For
this reason, the court denied the City's motion to dismiss the ap-
peal.374
The court then turned to the central issue in this case: the
mechanisms by which "different governmental entities may levy
and collect certain taxes and assessments on real estate.376 Citing
to section 58.1-3965(A), the court highlighted two provisions that
were important to this appeal.76 "First, [a] locality may not bring
suit to collect delinquent taxes on real estate until the December
31 two years after the real estate taxes became due.3 77 "Second,
the suit to collect such delinquent taxes may be enforced through
the sale of the real estate upon which the delinquent taxes were
levied.""37
369. Id. at 107, 766 S.E.2d at 914.
370. Id. at 107-08, 766 S.E.2d at 914.
371. Id. at 108, 766 S.E.2d at 914.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 109, 766 S.E.2d at 914-15 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-670(B)(2)(Repl.
Vol. 2015)).
374. See id. at 109, 766 S.E.2d at 915.
375. Id. at 110, 766 S.E.2d at 915.
376. Id. at 110, 766 S.E.2d at 915 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3965(A) (Repl. Vol.
2013)).
377. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3965(A) (Repl. Vol. 2013)). The General Assembly
allows a city to reduce the two-year delay built into Virginia Code section 58.1-3965(A) to a
single year by passing an ordinance. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3965.1 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
378. CVAS 2, 289 Va. at 110, 766 S.E.2d at 915 (VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3965(A) (Repl.
Vol. 2013)).
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With regard to the CDA assessments, the court explained that
although a CDA may request that a locality levy and collect a
special tax on its behalf, the CDA may not do so itself.7 Instead,
the method for a locality to collect such special taxes to be paid
over to the CDA is set forth in Virginia Code section 15.2-
5158(A)(3).8° Specifically, the special taxes must be collected "at
the same time and in the same manner as the locality's taxes are
collected ... .""' The City and CVAS 2 had opposing views as to
the operation of the statutory phrase "at the same time and in the
,,382
same manner....
The court, however, concluded that this phrase means exactly
what it says-"a special tax must be collected in accordance with
the procedural provisions that govern the collection of 'the locali-
ty's taxes,"' and the timing of collection is determined by the time
when the locality's taxes are collected.383 Consequently, in this
case, the City could "collect delinquent special taxes only at the
time when the City properly [sought] to collect delinquent real es-
tate taxes under Code § 58.1-3965."'
Like special taxes, a CDA also "has the ability to have a 'special
assessment ... imposed by the local governing body.' 385 However,
"as with special taxes, the [CDA] does not have the power to levy
and collect the special assessment i self.""38' The General Assem-
bly's method for a locality to collect such special assessments is
set forth in section 15.2-5158(A)(5).8 ' Unlike a special tax, a spe-
cial assessment must be collected as a lien.3 8 Further, the method
by which a delinquent special assessment is collected differs sig-
nificantly from the method in which a delinquent special tax is
collected.389 That is, a special assessment need not be collected "at
379. Id. at 111, 766 S.E.2d at 916.
380. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
381. Id. (quoting VA. CODEANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
382. Id.
383. Id. at 111-12, 766 S.E.2d at 916 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(3) (Repl.
Vol. 2012)).
384. Id. at 112, 766 S.E.2d at 917.
385. Id. at 113, 766 S.E.2d at 917 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(5) (Repl. Vol.
2012)).
386. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
387. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
388. Id. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2015), with VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
389. CVAS 2, 289 Va. at 113, 766 S.E.2d at 917. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-
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the same time and in the same manner" as another type of locali-
ty's taxes, but also, the real estate may not be sold in order to col-
lect a delinquent special assessment."'
"Having laid out the statutory framework," the court then ad-
dressed "whether the circuit court erred in entering the decree of
sale."39' The court concluded that "the City's suit, filed on June 13,
2013, to collect those delinquent real estate taxes was prema-
ture.,392 Pursuant to Virginia Code section 58.1-3965, the earliest
a suit can be brought to collect outstanding real estate taxes is
the December 31 two years after the anniversary of when the
taxes became due, which in this case, would have been December
31, 2013. 393 The court noted that "a suit to sell real estate to col-
lect delinquent taxes on ... property is purely a creature of stat-
ute.,394 As such, "[a] party's ability to 'enforce' such a statutory
right, 'rest[s] upon compliance with the statute."'399 In this case,
the City failed to strictly comply with the time requirements of
section 58.1-3965(A).396
Turning next to the issue of the collection of special assess-
ments, the court first distinguished between "special taxes," gov-
erned by section 15.2-5158(A)(3), and "special assessments," gov-
erned by section 15.2-5158(A)(5).397 "A special tax must come as
an 'annual request' by the [CDA] for the locality to 'levy and col-
lect' that tax so as to 'finance the services and facilities provided
by' the [CDA]." 399 On the other hand, "a special assessment arises
from 'improvements' to 'the services and facilities' provided 'to
abutting property within the district' under the [CDA's] over-
5158(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2015), with VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
390. CVAS 2, 289 Va. at 114, 766 S.E.2d at 917. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-
5158(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2015), with VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(5) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
391. CVAS 2, 289 Va. at 115, 766 S.E.2d at 918.
392. Id. at 116, 766 S.E.2d at 918 (citing VA. CODE ANN. 58.1-3965(A) (Cum. Supp.
2015)).
393. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3965 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
394. Id.
395. Id. (quoting Isle of Wight Materials Co., Inc. v. Cowling Bros., Inc., 246 Va. 103,
105, 431 S.E.2d 42, 43 (1993)).
396. Id. at 116, 766 S.E.2d at 918-919.
397. Id. at 118, 766 S.E.2d at 920. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(3) (Repl. Vol.
2012), with VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
398. CVAS 2, 289 Va. at 118, 766 S.E.2d at 920 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(3)
(Repl. Vol. 2012)).
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sight."'399 Determining whether an obligation is a special tax or a
special assessment for purposes of the Code is a mixed question of
law and fact."° Given the insufficiency of the record on this ques-
tion, the court declined to make the factual finding, holding in-
stead that it need not decide the issue, since "the circuit court
erred as a matter of law in entering the decree of sale regardless
of whether the delinquent special assessments [were] categorized
as special taxes or special assessments.4 0°
Assuming the special assessments were actually special taxes,
the collection of those special taxes would be governed by section
15.2-5158(A)(3) and the timing of that collection would be "dictat-
ed by when the City could collect such delinquent real estate tax-
es" under a special assessment section 58.1-3965(A).40 2 "Because
the City did not strictly comply with the time period in Code §§
15.2-5158(A)(3) and 58.1-3965(A) . . . the City had no authority
under those statutes to bring suit to sell CVAS 2's real estate as a
means to collect delinquent special taxes.40 3
"The collection of a delinquent 'special assessment' on behalf of
a [CDA] is governed by Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5).'0° Pursuant to
this subsection, special assessments "may be collected as a lien
upon the property if the locality has passed an ordinance allowing
for special assessments to be made effective in such a manner.
40 5
"[T]he plain language of Code § 15.2-5158(A)(5) does not invoke
the authority under § 58.1-3965(A) to sell real estate subject to a
special assessment.6 Again, because the City did not strictly
comply with the statute, the City had no authority "to bring suit
to sell CVAS 2's real estate as a means to collect the delinquent
special assessments.""7 For these reasons, the judgment of the
circuit court was reversed.4 8
399. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-5158(A)(5) (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
400. Id. at 127, 766 S.E.2d at 925 (Powell, J. concurring) (quoting Smyth Cty. Comm.
Hosp. v. Town of Marios, 259 Va. 328, 366, 527 S.E.2d 401, 405 (2000)).
401. Id. at 120, 766 S.E.2d at 921.
402. Id.




407. Id. at 122, 766 S.E.2d at 922.
408. Id.
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M. Statute of Limitations
Commonwealth ex rel. Fair Housing Board v. Windsor Plaza
Condominium Ass'n, Inc.,4"9 involved two consolidated appeals in
which the court considered various issues arising under the Vir-
ginia Fair Housing Law ("VFHL") 41 ° and the Federal Fair Housing
Amendments Act ("FHAA") of 1988.411 "Michael Fishel . .. filed
complaints with the Virginia Fair Housing Board (FHB) and the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), alleging that Windsor Plaza Condominium Association
(Windsor Plaza) had discriminated against him in violation of the
VFHL and the FHAA. '41 Fishel's complaint was based on the fact
that Windsor was unable to provide him with a handicap accessi-
ble parking space."'
After the FHB conducted an investigation and "determined
that reasonable cause existed to believe that Windsor Plaza had
engaged in a 'discriminatory housing practice ... in violation
of... Code § 36-96.3(B)(ii)[,]' ... the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, on behalf of the Commonwealth, filed a complaint against
Windsor Plaza in the Circuit Court of Arlington County."4 14 Plain-
tiffs alleged "that Windsor Plaza had ... [failed] 'to make reason-
able accommodations ... necessary to afford [Fishel] equal oppor-
tunity to use and enjoy [his] dwelling.'
41 5
Fishel and his wife moved to intervene in the Commonwealth's
lawsuit pursuant to Virginia Code section 36-96.16(B).41 6 The
Fishels also lodged a "Complaint in Intervention" alleging that
"Windsor Plaza had violated the VFHL by refusing their request
for a reasonable accommodation.4 7 The Fishels also asserted ad-
409. See Commonwealth ex rel. Fair Hous. Bd. v. Windsor Plaza Condo. Ass'n, Inc., et
al., 289 Va. 34, 768 S.E.2d 79 (2014).
410. Id. at 43, 768 S.E.2d at 82; see VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.1 (Repl. Vol. 2014) (stating
that chapter 5.1 of the Virginia Code is the Virginia Fair Housing Law).
411. Windsor, 289 Va. at 43, 768 S.E.2d at 82; see 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2012).
412. Windsor, 289 Va. at 43, 768 S.E.2d at 82.
413. See id. at 45-46, 768 S.E.2d at 84 (responding to the complaint, Windsor claimed
all garage spaces were individually owned and it could not force any individual parking
space owner to give up or trade his/her space in order to accommodate Fishel).
414. Id. at 43, 768 S.E.2d at 82.
415. Id.
416. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.16 (B) (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2015).
417. See Windsor, 289 Va. at 43, 768 S.E.2d at 82.
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ditional causes of action based on the allegedly discriminatory
practices of Windsor Plaza.418 The circuit court granted the motion
to intervene.9 Windsor Plaza then filed "a plea in bar to the
Fishels' intervening complaint, arguing that the Fishels' new
state and federal fair housing claims were barred by the applica-
ble statute of limitations.""42 "After a hearing... the circuit court
sustained Windsor Plaza's plea in bar to the Fishels' com-
plaint.42 1
The case proceeded to trial, and "at the close of the Common-
wealth's case-in-chief, Windsor Plaza moved to strike the Com-
monwealth's evidence and for summary judgment.4 22 "The circuit
court granted the motion.""42 The Commonwealth and the Fishels
filed separate appeals, which the court considered together.424
The Fishels' appeal included multiple assignments of error, the
second of which was that the circuit court erred in "applying the
statute of limitations period in Code § 36-36-96.18(B) to their ad-
ditional claims brought when they intervened" in the Common-
wealth's case.4 25 According to the Fishels, they intervened in the
Commonwealth's action pursuant to section 36-96.16, and under
subsection B, intervention "as of right.4 26 The Fishels argued that
"there is no statute of limitations for intervention under Rule 3:14
or Code § 36-96.16 and that circuit courts instead exercise their
sound discretion in permitting intervention."'27
In response, Windsor Plaza argued that sections 36-96.16 and
36-96.18 should be construed together, meaning that "the statute
of limitations period in Code § 36-96.18 [would apply] to the
Fishels' new claims."'428 Importantly, the Fishels not only inter-
vened in the Commonwealth's case, but they also filed an inter-
418. Id. at 43, 768 S.E.2d at 82-83.
419. Id. at 43, 768 S.E.2d at 83.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 44, 768 S.E.2d at 83.
422. Id. at 44-45, 768 S.E.2d at 83.
423. Id. at 45, 768 S.E.2d at 83.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 58, 768 S.E.2d at 90.
426. Id. at 61, 768 S.E.2d at 92.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 61-62, 768 S.E.2d at 92.
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vening complaint which raised additional causes of action sepa-
rate and apart from the Commonwealth's complaint.429
Section 36-96.16(B) enables an "aggrieved person" to intervene
in the Commonwealth's civil action.3 This section does not in-
clude a statute of limitations for claims made through interven-
tion. ' However, section 36-96.18(A), which permits "aggrieved
persons" to file original civil actions alleging "discriminatory
housing practices," does contain a limitations period.432 Notably,
"[t]he statutory language gives no indication that an intervenor's
civil action should be immune from the statute of limitations
normally applicable to claims brought by aggrieved persons."'33 In
fact, both statutes use the term "aggrieved person" to describe a
private party plaintiff.434 Thus, the court held that "[w]hen an ag-
grieved person not only intervenes in a civil action, but also files a
new claim not previously asserted, the applicable statute of limi-
tations applies to that new claim." '435 Therefore, "the circuit court
did not err in applying the statute of limitations in Code § 36-
9 6 1 8 .
436
Multiple circuit court opinions discussing statutes of limita-
tions are also worthy of inclusion in this discussion. Graham v.
United Services Automobile Ass'n dealt with a contractual limita-
tions provision contained in a fire insurance policy.4 7 In Massie v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that contractual limitation provisions were not subject to the toll-
ing provisions of Virginia Code section 8.01-229(E), which would
429. Id. at 62, 768 S.E.2d at 92.
430. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.16 (B) (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2015).
431. Id.
432. See VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.18(B) (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2015). The Vir-
ginia Code states:
An aggrieved person may commence a civil action under §36-96.18(A) no later
than 180 days after the conclusion of the administrative process with respect
to a complaint or charge, or not later than two years after the occurrence or
the termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice, whichever is
later.
Id.
433. Windsor, 289 Va. at 62, 768 S.E.2d at 93.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 63, 768 S.E.2d at 93.
436. Id.
437. Graham v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 89 Va. Cir. 94, 94-95 (2014) (Prince William
County).
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otherwise allow a plaintiff a minimum of six months in which to
refile following a nonsuit."' In the intervening years, several fed-
eral cases held that where a limitations provision was statutorily
mandated, as in the case of a standard fire insurance policy, the
limitations provision was the functional equivalent of a statute of
limitations and subject to tolling under section 8.01-229(E).39
However, Judge Johnston declined to follow suit and, after a de-
tailed analysis of Title 38.2, he concluded that "there is nothing in
the statutory scheme ... which evinces an intent by the legisla-
ture to convert insurance contracts to something besides con-
tracts of insurance, such as statutes of limitation."" Accordingly,
he concluded that a special assessment, section 8.01-229(E)'s toll-
ing provision did not apply to contractual limitations provisions
even where the provision is statutorily mandated.4
A second tolling case of note is Law v. PHC-Martinsville, Inc."2
In this medical malpractice case, the plaintiff initially filed and
then nonsuited her case having to do with certain medication
administered by defendants.43 In her refiled action, plaintiff ex-
panded upon her allegations to state that "the hospital made an
ill-advised arbitrary decision to substitute Doripenem for Merrem
in all situations where the ordered [sic] physician prescribed
Merrem, and that 'the hospital failed to promulgate the results of
this decision regarding Doripenem/Merrem to nurses and/or staff
physicians."'444 These allegations did not appear in the previously
filed action.4 Judge Greer observed that there was no appellate
decision directly on point and that the reported trial court deci-
sions are in conflict as to whether to apply the "same evidence"
test or the "same transaction" test.446 Clearly, in the Judge's view,
438. Massie v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 256 Va. 161, 162, 165, 500 S.E.2d 509, 510-11
(1998).
439. See, e.g., Vaughan v. First Liberty Ins. Corp., No. 3:09cv364, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 108045, at *8-9, *14-15 (E.D. Va. Nov. 13, 2009); Zaeno Int'l, Inc. v. State Farm
Fire & Cas., 152 F. Supp. 2d 882, 884-85 (E.D. Va. 2001); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Clover, No.
5:98CV00092, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14282, at *11-16 (E.D. Va. Sept. 1, 2000).
440. Graham, 89 Va. Cir. at 94-95, 97.
441. Id. at 95-96, 98.
442. Law v. PHC-Martinsville, Inc., 89 Va. Cir. 231, 232 (2014) (Martinsville City).
443. Id. at 231-32.
444. Id. at 232.
445. Id.
446. Id. (citing Dunston v. Huang, 709 F. Supp. 2d 414 (E.D. Va. 2010) (applying the
"same transaction" test); Lawton-Gunter v. Meyer, 88 Va. Cir. 327 (2014) (Roanoke City)
(applying the "same evidence" test)).
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applying the "same evidence" test would result in striking this
portion of plaintiffs claim as time-barred, whereas all of the alle-
gations in plaintiffs refiled action arose out of the same transac-
tion or occurrence.4 '7 Between these two alternatives, the Judge
found Dunston v. Huang's "same transaction" test more persua-
sive and followed it.
445
Finally, there is Newman v. Freeman Homes, Inc."' This case
arose in connection with the sale of a new home and involved
claims of breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and
fraud.5 ° Plaintiff took an initial nonsuit as to the warranty
claims.4 1 A second nonsuit, approximately fourteen months later,
went to the breach of contract claim and, as it was the sole re-
maining claim at the time, this nonsuit ended the action.52 The
refiled action was filed within six months of the final nonsuit, but
more than six months from the initial one .45 Thus, the notable is-
sue was whether section 8.01-229(E)'s tolling provision applied to
the warranty claims.5 Relying on McKinney v. Virginia Surgical
Associates,55 Judge Martin held that the final nonsuit and section
8.01-229(E)'s tolling provision applied to plaintiffs "cause of ac-
tion" which subsumed at least two "rights of action," for example,
breach of contract and breach of warranty. '56 Thus, both were held
to have been timely refiled.5 7
N. Offset of Settlement Amounts
RGR, LLC v. Settle involved a "wrongful death action arising
out of a collision at a private railroad crossing.4 8 "RGR, LLC
(RGR) appeal[ed] the jury's verdict awarding $2.5 million to
Georgia Settle (Mrs. Settle) for the death of her husband, Charles
447. PHC-Martinsville, 89 Va. Cir. at 232.
448. Id. at 233.
449. Newman v. Freeman Homes, Inc., 89 Va. Cir. 377 (2014) (Norfolk City).
450. Id. at 377-78.
451. Id. at 378.
452. Id. at 380.
453. Id.
454. See id. at 379-80.
455. 284 Va. 455, 732 S.E.2d 27 (2012).
456. Newman, 89 Va. Cir. at 379-80.
457. Id. at 379-80.
458. 288 Va. 260, 268, 764 S.E.2d 8, 12 (2014).
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E. Settle, Sr. (Settle).'45 9 "Settle was fatally injured when a train
owned and operated by Norfolk Southern Corporation (Norfolk
Southern) [hit] the dump truck that he was [driving]. '460 "Adja-
cent to the railroad tracks" where the accident occurred, RGR
"operated a business offloading lumber from train cars and re-
loading it onto tractor-trailers."61 On the day of the accident,
RGR's lumber was stacked near the railroad tracks, allegedly
blocking Settle's view of the approaching train."462 n her wrongful
death action, Mrs. Settle named "RGR, Norfolk Southern, and
two other commercial business entities as defendants.'463 "[She]
alleged that the defendants created a hazardous condition by
stacking lumber near the railroad tracks, breached their duty of
reasonable care,... and failed to take reasonable steps to make
the railroad crossing safe.'464 "Before [the] trial, the claim against
Norfolk Southern was settled.,465 At trial, "[t]he jury returned a
verdict for Mrs. Settle in the amount of $2.5 million, along with
pre-judgment interest.
4 66
Both parties agreed, however, to suspend entry of the circuit
court's final order "to address the parties' disagreement on how to
calculate the offset of the $500,000 settlement Mrs. Settle ob-
tained from Norfolk Southern, pursuant to Code § 8.01-35.1
(A)(1). 467 Mrs. Settle argued that section 8.01-35.1(A)(1) "re-
quire[s] that the settlement amount be deducted from the sum of
the $2.5 million verdict plus the prejudgment interest awarded by
the jury.' 465 RGR asserted that the amount of the settlement
"should be subtracted from the $2.5 million jury award, with pre-
judgment interest then calculated on the difference.'469 The circuit
court agreed with Mrs. Settle's calculation and "entered judgment
against RGR in the amount of $2,585,205.48.'470
459. Id.
460. Id.









470. Id. at 274, 764 S.E.2d at 15-16.
20151
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
On appeal, RGR challenged the circuit court's decision to adopt
Mrs. Settle's calculation of the offset under section 8.01-35.1.
4 1
1
RGR argued that the phrase "principal sum awarded," as used in
Virginia Code section 8.01-382, should only include the principal
amount awarded, not prejudgment interest or post-judgment in-
terest.472 In this case, that would mean that the settlement
amount would be deducted from the jury award of $2.5 million.478
"In response, Mrs. Settle [asserted] that the phrase 'amount re-
covered' in Code § 8.01-35.1 'unmistakably' means the amount of
damages awarded plus any prejudgment interest.' 474 "[B]ecause
prejudgment interest is 'normally designed to make the plaintiff
whole and is part of the actual damages sought to be recovered,"'
Mrs. Settle argued "that the term 'amount recovered' cannot be
interpreted to mean only the 'principal sum awarded' as used in
Code § 8.01-382."'
In construing the two statutes, the court concluded that "the
purposes underlying Code § 8.01-35.1 require that the $500,000
settlement amount be subtracted from the $2.5 million damage
award before calculating the prejudgment interest also awarded
by the jury. '476 The circuit court's construction of section 8.01-35.1
negated the offset benefit to the non-settling tortfeasor "by re-
quiring the non-settling tortfeasor to pay interest on the offset
amount.,477 In other words, RGR should not be required to pay in-
terest on the $500,000 paid by Norfolk Southern in settlement
with Mrs. Settle.478 And so, on the issue of the calculation of the
offset, the court "reverse[d] the circuit court's judgment and re-
mand[ed] for further proceedings.479
471. Id. at 294, 764 S.E.2d at 27.
472. Id. at 294, 764 S.E.2d at 27-28.
473. Id. at 294, 764 S.E.2d at 27.
474. Id. at 294, 764 S.E.2d at 28.
475. Id. (quoting Shepard v. Capitol Foundry of Va., 262 Va. 715, 722, 554 S.E.2d 72,
76 (2001)).
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0. Equitable Tolling
In Birchwood-Manassas Associates, L.L. C. v. Birchwood at Oak
Knoll Farm, L.L.C., the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to ex-
tend the doctrine of equitable tolling to situations where self-
dealing or breach of fiduciary duty prevented the plaintiff from
bringing suit.48° As the names of the parties imply, this case dealt
with related entities under common ownership and manage-
ment.481 A member of Birchwood-Manassas brought suit seeking
dissolution and appointment of a liquidating trustee for the
LLC. s2 The trustee demanded immediate repayment and brought
suit on behalf of Birchwood-Manassas against related entities to
collect on various loans and transfers as reflected on the compa-
ny's books."' There were no formal loan documents or terms of
repayment.4 4 As the obligations being sued upon were more than
three years old, all parties agreed they were time-barred unless
equitable tolling applied.85 Citing Brunswick Land Corp. v. Per-
kinson, the trustee argued that the conflict of interest and breach
of fiduciary duty by the managers of the LLC in failing to seek
repayment within the statute of limitations against other related
entities they also owned and controlled should be recognized as
grounds for equitable tolling.4 6 The Supreme Court of Virginia
reaffirmed the doctrine of equitable tolling as it had previously
been recognized, for example, "where fraud prevents the plaintiff
from asserting its claims," or where the defendant "has by affirm-
ative act deprived the plaintiff of his power to assert his cause of
action in due season.'487 The court, however, expressly declined to
extend the doctrine any further, including affiliated entities with
overlapping management, noting in this case that any member of
the LLC could have brought a derivative action at any time.488
Holding that Birchwood-Manassas had "sle[pt] on their rights,"
480. 289 Va_ ___ 773 S.E.2d 162, 164 (2015).





486. Id. at __ 773 S.E.2d at 164 (citing Brunswick Land Corp. v. Perkinson, 153 Va.
603, 608, 151 S.E.2d 138, 140 (1930)).
487. Id. (quoting Brunswick Land Corp., 153 Va. at 608, 151 S.E.2d at 140).
488. Id.
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the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the trustee's ac-
tion.489
P. Virginia Consumer Protection Act
The Supreme Court of Virginia clarified the standard of proof
in actions brought under the VCPA in Ballagh v. Fauber Enter-
prises, Inc.49 The case involved allegations of fraud and misrepre-
sentation by the seller of real estate related to water leaks in the
basement.4"1 As to the plaintiffs' claims under Virginia Code sec-
tions 59.1-200(A)(6) and 59.1-200(A)(14) of the VCPA, the parties
presented conflicting jury instructions regarding the burden of
proof.492 The trial court accepted the defendants' argument that
the VCPA claims were akin to common law fraud, which is sub-
ject to a "clear and convincing" standard.4" The trial judge gave
this instruction, and the jury returned a verdict for the defense.4 4
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia analyzed the VCPA
and found no indication of intent by the General Assembly to ap-
ply anything other than the normal preponderance standard to
actions under the Act.499 Accordingly, the verdict was set aside
and the matter was remanded for a new trial.49
Q. Judicial Estoppel
In Harvard v. Shore Bank, Judge Poston provided an excellent
analysis of the doctrine of judicial estoppel or estoppel by "incon-
sistent positions.""4 7 The factual background of the case is rather
489. Id. (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Willis, 200 Va. 299, 306, 105 S.E.2d
833, 839 (1958)).
490. 289 Va. -,... 773 S.E.2d 366, 368 (2015) (indicating the preponderance standard
applies to new statutory causes of actions unless expressly stating otherwise).




495. Id. at -, 773 S.E.2d at 368 (reasoning the General Assembly chose to include ex-
press direction in the VCPA, and the court must give such direction full effect by constru-
ing "remedial legislation" liberally, in favor of the injured party); see VA. CODE ANN. §
59.1-197 (Repl. Vol. 2015) (indicating the VCPA "shall be applied as remedial legislation to
promote fair and ethical standards of dealings between supplies and the consuming pub-
lic").
496. Ballagh, 289 Va. at-, 773 S.E.2d at 370.
497. Harvard v. Shore Bank, 89 Va. Cir. 328, 331-34 (2014) (Norfolk City), rev'd on
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dense. At issue was the severance compensation due to the for-
mer President of Shore Bank under his employment agreement
and the effects of such executive compensation agreements in re-
lation to the Troubled Assets Relief Program ("TARP") legisla-
tion.498 In connection with the plea at bar, Shore and Hampton
Roads Bankshares argued that they were both "TARP fund recip-
ients" for purposes of application of TARP's restrictions on "gold-
en parachute" payments to executives.499 Significantly, the circuit
court denied the plea.00 Later, the banks took a contradictory po-
sition and the plaintiff sought to invoke the doctrine of judicial
estoppel.5"' After summarizing the doctrine of judicial estoppel,
the court focused on the element requiring the court to have "re-
lied" on the position taken by the adverse party in order to invoke
judicial estoppel."°2 This element has been interpreted to mean
that the party against whom judicial estoppel is invoked must
have prevailed in their prior inconsistent position."3 However, re-
lying primarily on Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Norfolk
Southern Railway,°4 Judge Poston held that "relied upon" merely
required the position to have been relevant to a prior ruling and
did not require that the party prevailed in their original posi-
tion."'
R. Relation Back
In Rife v. Buchanan County Hospice, Judge Johnson weighed in
on an issue dividing the circuit courts in Virginia related to the
application of Virginia Code section 8.01-6. 1.506 This section states
other grounds, 2015 Va. LEXIS 95 (2015).
498. Id. at 328-31; see generally 12 U.S.C. § 52 (2008) (granting the Secretary of the
Treasury the authority to purchase and insure certain types of troubled assets from finan-
cial institutions in order to provide liquidity to such institutions).
499. Harvard, 89 Va. Cir. at 330-31 (quoting 111 Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 7001, 123 Stat.
517 (2009) & 31 C.F.R. § 30.1 (2009)).
500. Id. at 331.
501. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id. (citing Matthews v. Matthews, 277 Va. 522, 529, 675 S.E.2d 157, 161 (2009);
Bentley Funding Grp. v. SK&R Grp., 269 Va. 315, 327, 609 S.E.2d 49, 54-55 (2005)).
504. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 278 Va. 444, 463, 683 S.E.2d 517,
528 (2009).
505. Harvard, 89 Va. Cir. 328, 332 (2014) (Norfolk City), rev'd on other grounds, 2015
Va. LEXIS 95 (2015).
506. Rife v. Buchanan Cty. Hospice, 89 Va. Cir. 396, 399 (2015) (Buchanan County).
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that a claim or defense will "relate back" if: (i) the claim or de-
fense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction or occurrence set forth in the original pleading; (ii)
the amending party was reasonably diligent in asserting the
amended claim or defense; and (iii) parties opposing the amend-
ment will not be substantially prejudiced."7
The case arose in connection with the hospice care of plaintiffs
decedent."0 The case was originally filed on a theory of re-
spondeat superior.09 Later, the case was amended to add several
additional allegations, including one of negligent retention of cer-
tain employees.10 The case was nonsuited and refiled, however,
this is not another tolling case under section 8.01-229(E).51' Ra-
ther, the issue had to do with whether the additional allegations
related to negligent retention in the original action were timely as
this amendment was filed more than two years after the date of
the injury. 12 The opinion notes that reported circuit court deci-
sions are split as to whether the statute was intended merely to
codify the Supreme Court of Virginia's "cause of action" analysis
in Vines v. Branch or to articulate a new and different test for re-
lation back.513 As between these approaches, the Judge stated:
"the Court is of the opinion that Code § 8.01-6.1 ... reflects the
common law test as enunciated in Vines; when a new claim is
added in amended complaint, it does not relate back to the origi-
nal complaint under Code § 8.01-6.1."' Conversely, "[w]here an
amended complaint merely expounds the factual allegations pre-
viously made, a new cause of action has not been introduced.51 5
507. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-6.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015).




512. Id. at 397-98.
513. Rife, 89 Va. Cir. at 398-400; see Vines v. Branch, 244 Va. 185, 185, 418 S.E.2d
890, 891 (1992). Compare Swanson v. Woods Serv. Ctr., Inc., 71 Va. Cir. 281, 282 (2006)
(Roanoke County) (holding the statute a codification of common law), with Clark v. Britt,
79 Va. Cir. 60, 66 (2009) (Fairfax County) (holding the statute to be a "clear and unambig-
uous departure" from the common law).
514. Rife, 89 Va. Cir. at 400.
515. Id.
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S. Electronically Stored Information and Spoliation
Noting that "[t]here is a dearth of Virginia case law on the sub-
ject of ESI discovery," Judge Carson provided a useful analytical
framework in Huff v. Winston."' The case involved an allegedly
wrongful termination; however, the framework set out in the
opinion can be adapted to virtually any case.17 The judge started
off with the statement that "[i]n evaluating this or any discovery
dispute, of critical importance to this [c]ourt, and consistent with
the Rules governing discovery of ESI, is the concept of reasona-
bleness."'18 The circuit court then set out a five part analysis:
1. Is the contemplated discovery reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence?
2. Is the discovery reasonably narrow in its scope?
3. If the responding party is objecting to the discovery on the basis
that it is burdensome or costly, what is the burden to the responding
party as compared to the potentially prejudicial effect to the request-
ing party if the discovery is limited or quashed?
4. After some showing by the responding party regarding the esti-
mated cost of production, is it most reasonable to leave the costs as-
sociated with production with the responding party; or is some shift-
ing of costs more reasonable; or in a particular case is it most
reasonable to simply determine that production costs are a taxable
cost that the court can award to the prevailing party at the conclu-
sion of the litigation?
5. Finally, in their dealings leading up to their appearance in court,
have the parties conferred and reasonably attempted to resolve their
dispute as specifically contemplated by Rule 4:12(a)(2)?5' 9
Applying the above framework, the judge ended up ordering
most, but not all, of the discovery sought.2' No fee shifting was
ordered, nor were fees awarded for bringing the motion to compel,
which prompted the circuit court's ruling.5 2' Emphasizing the
need and expectation of communication and cooperation among
counsel, the circuit court's concluding statement was:
ESI matters are inherently complex, involving multifaceted and ev-
er-changing technology, which necessarily requires communication
516. 89 Va. Cir. 429, 431 (2015) (Roanoke County).
517. Id. at 429.
518. Id. at 431.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 432.
521. Id. at 432-33.
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and compromise between counsel in the event of a dispute .... Thus,
I both contemplate and expect that counsel will confer with one an-
other to shore u any remaining details in order to comply with my
rulings, supra.
The reverse situation was presented in Bannon v. Bannon, a
divorce action where the defendant materially impeded electronic
discovery by, among other things, reformatting the hard drive on
a personal computer containing the couple's financial records and
refusing to produce mobile digital devices containing potentially
relevant evidence.523 Citing various authorities from both Virginia
and elsewhere, Judge Harris invoked the adverse inference sanc-
tion for spoliation of evidence and held that such information had
it been made available, would have tended to prove defendant's
adultery and secretion and waste of marital assets."' The treatis-
es and cases cited in the opinion provide useful supporting au-
thorities for those pursuing spoliation claims.52
II. AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF COURT
A. The Judicial Performance Evaluation Program
By an order dated October 31, 2014, and effective immediately,
the Supreme Court of Virginia promulgated Rule 9:1, defining the
purpose and operation of the Judicial Performance Evaluation
("JPE") program.526 Established pursuant to Virginia Code section
17.1-100, the purpose of Virginia's JPE program is twofold: (1)
providing a mechanism for judge self-improvement and (2)
providing a source of information for the re-election of judges by
the General Assembly.
527
New Rule 9:2 ensures that all surveys, responses, evaluations,
and other records created or maintained as a part of the JPE pro-
gram will remain confidential.2 JPE program records are not to
522. Id. at 433.
523. Bannon v. Bannon, 89 Va. Cir. 274, 275-76 (2014) (Hanover County).
524. Id.
525. See id. at 274-76.
526. Order Amending Rule 9:1, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Oct. 31, 2014)
(effective immediately), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendmentstracked/ru
le_9_l_interlineated.pdf.
527. VA. SUP. CT. R. 9:1 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
528. VA. SUP. CT. R. 9:2 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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be disclosed to any third party, unless a report is provided to the
General Assembly, at which point the evaluation will be a public
record.5
B. Admission to Practice
On October 31, 2014, the Supreme Court of Virginia amended
Rule 1A: 1, relating to admission to practice in the Commonwealth
without examination stating:
Any person who has been admitted to practice law before the court of
last resort of any state or territory of the United States or of the Dis-
trict of Columbia may file an application to be admitted to practice
law in this Commonwealth without examination, if counsel licensed
to practice law in this Commonwealth may be admitted in that ju-
risdiction without examination.1
30
The regulations governing applications for admission to the Vir-
ginia Bar have also been revised.531 Specifically, section (a) of the
Rule, which discusses reciprocity, has been edited to eliminate
the requirement that an applicant must have passed the bar ex-
amination in another jurisdiction.5 32 Now, the Virginia Board of
Bar Examiners may consider an application for admission with-
out examination from persons who have been admitted to practice
in courts of other jurisdictions, provided the other jurisdiction
permits lawyers licensed in Virginia to be admitted to practice
without examination.533
C. Virginia Rules of Evidence
The Supreme Court of Virginia's order dated November 12,
2014, effective July 1, 2015, amended Part Two of the Virginia
Rules of Evidence in two significant ways.5 34 First, the court add-
529. Order Amending Rule 9:2, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Oct. 31, 2014)
(effective immediately), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendmentstracked/rul
e_9_2interlineated.pdf; R. 9:2 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
530. Order Amending Rule 1A: 1, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Oct. 31, 2014)
(effective immediately), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments-tracked/20
14_1031_update.pdf; see VA. SUP. CT. R. 1A:A (Repl. Vol. 2015).
531. Order Amending Rule 1A:1, supra note 530; R. 1A: 1 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
532. R. 1A:1 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
533. Id.
534. Order Amending Rule 2:801, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Nov. 12,
2014) (effective July 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments-trac
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ed a definition of "Prior Statements" to the definitions section of
Article VIII defining Hearsay, stating, in pertinent part: "a prior
statement... is hearsay if offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matters it asserts, but may be received in evidence for all
purposes if the statement is admissible under any hearsay excep-
tion provided in Rules 2:803 or 2:804."' Furthermore, the
amended Rule provides that a prior statement may also be admit-
ted as a "Prior Inconsistent Statement" or a "Prior Consistent
Statement.,1
36
Additionally, Article VIII of Part Two was amended by modify-
ing the section entitled "Hearsay Exceptions Applicable Regard-
less of Availability of the Declarant.,,13' The court added a new,
more encompassing section entitled "Records of Regularly Con-
ducted Activity." '538 The Rule states that a record is admissible
under this section if:
(A) the record was made at or near the time of the acts, events, cal-
culations, or conditions by-or from information transmitted by-
someone with knowledge; (B) the record was made and kept in the
course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization,
occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; (C) making and
keeping the record was a regular practice of that activity; (D) all the-
se conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another
qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule
2:902(6) or with a statute permitting certification; and (E) neither
the source of information nor the method or circumstances of prepa-
ration indicate a lack of trustworthiness.,
539
The court first adopted a comprehensive set of evidentiary
rules in June 2012, bringing Virginia in line with the vast majori-
ty of other states in the country that have adopted rules of evi-
dence.54°
ked/interlineated rule-_2_801.pdf; Order Amending Rule 2:803, Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia (Nov. 12, 2014) (effective July 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/
courts/scv/amendments trackedlinterlineatedrule_2_803.pdf.
535. VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:801 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
536. Id.
537. VA. SUP. CT. R. 2:803 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Order Amending Part Two Virginia Rules of Evidence, Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia (June 1, 2012) (effective July 1, 2012), http://www.courts.state.va.us/
courts/scv/amendments2012_0525_part_2.pdf.
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D. Discovery
By an order dated February 27, 2015, effective May 1, 2015,
the Supreme Court of Virginia amended Part Four of the Rules,
specifically Rule 4:11, which sets forth the guidelines governing
requests for admission.541 The court amended the Rule by adding
subsection (e), which set a limit on the number of requests for
54admission that a party may request of another party. 42 At any
one time or cumulatively, a party may serve another party only
thirty requests for admission that do not relate to the genuine-
ness of a document.5. However, if requests for admission are re-
lated to the genuineness of documents, then the court does not
limit the number of requests available.5" In the interest of justice,
the court will liberally grant leave to propound additional re-
quests or limit requests.5
E. Procedures for Notification to Clients When a Lawyer Leaves a
Law Firm or When a Law Firm Dissolves
On February 27, 2015, the Supreme Court of Virginia approved
a petition presented by the Virginia State Bar relating to the ad-
dition of Rule 5:8 to Part Six of the Rules of the court.546 Part Six
of the Rules discusses the integration of the State Bar, and new
Rule 5:8 sets forth procedures for notification of clients when a
lawyer leaves a law firm or when a law firm dissolves."7 In sum,
Rule 5:8 requires that when a lawyer seeks to leave his or her law
firm, he or she must confer with an authorized representative of
that law firm regarding how to best communicate with the clients
regarding future representation.4 ' Absent a specific agreement
otherwise, neither a lawyer who is leaving a law firm nor other
541. Order Amending Rule 4:11, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Feb. 27, 2015)
(effective May 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendmentstracked/ru
le_4_11interlineated.pdf.




546. Order Amending Rule 5.8, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Feb. 27, 2015)
(effective May 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2015_02_27
_part%206 rule 5 8 vsb.pdf.
547. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:8 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
548. Id.
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lawyers in the firm may unilaterally contact clients of the law
firm for purposes of notifying them about the anticipated depar-
ture or to solicit representation of the clients unless the lawyer
and the law firm have conferred and been unable to agree on a
joint communication to clients.549 Any communications with cli-
ents by a lawyer leaving a law firm, or by members of a dissolving
law firm, must not contain false or misleading statements, and
must notify the client of his option to choose representation.55 ° If a
client of a departing lawyer fails to advise the lawyer and law
firm of the client's intention with regard to who is to provide fu-
ture legal services, the client is deemed to be a client of the law
firm until the client advises otherwise, or until the law firm ter-
minates the engagement in writing.5 '
F. Provisional Admission to the Virginia Bar for a Military
Spouse
Through its order dated February 27, 2015, effective immedi-
ately, the Supreme Court of Virginia amended Rule 1A:8 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, which addresses how a
military spouse, upon motion, can be provisionally admitted to
the practice of law in Virginia.'52 As amended, the Rule requires
approved applicants to take and subscribe to the oath, required of
attorneys at law in Virginia, by appearing before the Justices of
the Supreme Court of Virginia in Richmond, or by appearing be-
fore a judge of a court of record in Virginia .5  The oath remains





552. Order Amending Rule 1A:8A, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Feb. 27,
2015) (effective immediately), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendmentstrack
ed/rule la 8 interlineated.pdf. Rule 1A:8 was originally adopted May 16, 2014, and be-
came effective July 1, 2014. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1A:8 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
553. R. 1A:8 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
554. Id.
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G. Citation of Supplemental Authorities
By order entered on April 10, 2015, the supreme court added,
amended, and deleted multiple rules.5 5 The first change is the
addition of Rules 5:6A and 5A:4A, regarding the citation of sup-
plemental authorities."' Both Rules state as follows:
If pertinent and significant authorities come to a party's attention
after the party's petition for appeal, brief in opposition, or brief has
been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may
promptly advise the clerk by letter, with a copy to all other parties,
setting forth the citations. The letter must state the reasons for the
supplemental citations, referring either to the page of the brief or to
a point argued orally. The body of the letter must not exceed 350
words. Any response must be made promptly and shall not exceed
350 words. The Court, in its discretion, may refuse to consider the
supplemental authorities if they unfairly expand the scope of the ar-
guments on brief, raise matters that should have been previously
briefed, appear to be untimely, or are otherwise inappropriate to
consider.
H. Notice of Appeal
The court's April 10, 2015 order also amended Rule 5:9 regard-
ing the notice of appeal.5  Subsection (b) provides that a notice of
appeal shall alert the court if any transcript or statement of facts
will be filed. 9 In the event that a transcript is to be filed, the no-
tice of appeal must certify that a copy of the transcript has been
ordered from the court reporter.560 Alternatively, subsection (b)
now provides that if the transcript is already in the possession of
the appellant or was previously filed, the notice of appeal should
555. See Amendments to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, http://www.courts.state.va.
us/courts/scv/amend.html ( ast visited Oct. 1, 2015).
556. Order Amending Rule 5:6A & 5A:4A, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Apr.
10, 2015) (effective July 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/20
15_0410rule_5_6a_5_95175185195_20_5_20a530_5a_4a_5a_6_5a_12 5  23.pdf.
557. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:6A (Repl. Vol. 2015); VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:4A (Repl. Vol. 2015).
558. Order Amending Rule 5:9 (Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Apr. 10, 2015)
(effective July 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2015_0410_
rule_5_6a 59517 5 18 5_195_20 5 20a 5 30 5a 4a 5a 6 5a .12 5a 23.pdf.
559. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:9 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
560. Id.
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inform the court of this fact.56' The court made this same change
to Rule 5A:6, which relates to the filing of a notice of appeal with
the Virginia Court of Appeals.62
I. Petition for Appeal
Among other things, Rule 5:17 outlines what a petition filed
with the Supreme Court of Virginia must contain."' Previously,
under a heading entitled "Assignments of Error," the Rule re-
quired the petition to list "the specific errors in the rulings below
upon which the party intended to rely" on appeal.564 As amended,
the petition may alternatively list the specific existing case law
that should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed. 65 The
court made this same change to Rule 5A:12, which sets forth the
content requirements for a petition filed with the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia.566
The court's April 10, 2015 order also amended Rule 5:17 by
adding a requirement that the appellant send notice of oral ar-
gument to counsel for the appellee or any pro se appellee who has
filed a brief in opposition or otherwise appeared in the appeal.567
J. Briefing on Appeal
Among the other amendments effected by the court's order dat-
ed April 10, 2015, were changes to the rules governing the filing
of appeal briefs. Rule 5:18(b), which governs the form and content
of a brief in opposition, was amended to add the requirement that
the brief in opposition be signed by at least one counsel of rec-
ord.' The court also amended Rule 5:19, changing the timeline
561. Id.
562. VA. SuP. CT. R. 5A:6 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
563. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
564. R. 5:17(c)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
565. Id.
566. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:12 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
567. Order Amending Rule 5:17, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Apr. 10, 2015)
(effective July 1, 2014), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2015_0410_
ruleS5_6a_5_9_5_17_5_18_5_19_5_20_5_20a_5_30_5a_4a_5a65a12  23.pdf.
568. Order Amending Rule 5:18, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Apr. 10, 2015)
(effective July 1, 2014), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2015_0410_
rule_5_6a_5_9_5_17_5_18 5_19_5_20_5_20a_5_30_5a_4a_5a6_5a_12_5a_23.pdf.
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for submission of a reply brief.5 When cross-error is assigned in a
brief in opposition, the appellant now has fourteen days (as op-
posed to seven) to file a reply brief with the clerk.57°
Through its order dated April 10, 2015, effective July 1, 2015,
the Supreme Court of Virginia also amended Rules 5:30 and
5A:23.571 Both Rules now allow a brief amicus curiae to be filed
during the petition, perfected appeal or rehearing stages of the
appellate proceedings and in proceedings invoking the court's
original jurisdiction.
572
K. Petition for Rehearing
The court significantly amended Rule 5:20, which "governs re-
quests for rehearing of the refusal or dismissal of a petition for
appeal filed pursuant to Rule 5:17, the refusal of one or more as-
signments of cross-error, or the disposition of an original jurisdic-
tion petition filed pursuant to Rule 5:7, Rule 5:7A, or Rule
5:7B.'5 7' As amended, Rule 5:20 incorporates the provisions of old
Rule 5:20A and sets forth guidelines regarding the time to file a
petition, the filing requirements, oral arguments, notification of
the action taken on the petition, and attorney's fees.74 The court
deleted Rule 5:20A.
575
L. Petitions for Review
By an order dated April 10, 2015, effective July 1, 2015, the
Supreme Court of Virginia amended Rule 5:17A, and added Rule
5A:38 regarding petitions for review pursuant to Virginia Code
section 8.01-626."'6 The court's order resulted in several changes
569. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:19 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
570. Id.
571. Order Amending Rules 5:30 & 5A:23, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Apr.
10, 2015) (effective July 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/20
150410_rule_5_6a_59517518_5_19 5 20_5_20a_5 30_5a_4a_5a_6_5a_12 5a 23.pdf.
572. VA. SuP. CT. R. 5:30(a) (Repl. Vol. 2015); VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:23(a) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
573. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:20 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
574. Id. Notably, Rule 5:20(c) requires that petitions for rehearing be filed electronical-
ly. Subsection (c) enumerates the requirements for electronic filing with the court. Id.
575. R. 5:20A (Repl. Vol. 2015).
576. Order Amending Rules 5:17A & 5A:23, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia
(Apr. 10, 2015) (effective July 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amend
ments/2015_0410_rule_5_17a 5a-38.pdf.
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to Rule 5:17A.577 First, the court addressed the appropriate time
for filing.578 A petition for review must be filed within fifteen days
of either, "(i) an order of a circuit court that grants an injunction,
refuses an injunction, or dissolves or refuses to enlarge an exist-
ing injunction; or (ii) an order of the Court of Appeals deciding a
petition for review filed in that court pursuant to Code § 8.01-
626.""'9 Additionally, the court revised the process for sending a
copy of the petition to opposing counsel.58 The amended Rule pro-
vides that "[a]t the same time that the petition is served, a copy of
the petition shall also be emailed to counsel for the respondent,
unless said counsel does not have, or does not provide, an email
address."58' Notably, the parties may agree to serve the petition
solely by email.
8 2
The court also amended the requirements regarding the appro-
priate length of the petition for review and what the petition for
review must contain.8 The Rule now requires that the petition be
accompanied by a copy of the pertinent portions of the record of
the lower court as well as a certificate that: (1) provides identifi-
cation and contact information for the parties and their counsel;
(2) certifies that a copy of the petition has been served on all op-
posing counsel; (3) certifies the number of words used; and (4)
certifies that the copy of the record being filed is accurate.584 In
addition, the court amended the filing fee requirement, allowing
the clerk of the court to file a petition for review that is not ac-
companied with the fee, as long as the clerk receives the fee with-
in five days of the date the petition of review is filed.8 5
Perhaps the most significant changes to Rule 5:17A are the re-
visions to subsection (f) describing the scope and review of a peti-
tion, and the addition of subsection (g) regarding responsive
pleadings.586 First, the court may consider a petition for review
whether the lower court's order on the injunction is temporary or
577. VA. SuP. CT. R. 5:17A (Repl. Vol. 2015).
578. Id.
579. R. 5:17A(a) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
580. R. 5:17A(b) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
581. Id.
582. Id.
583. R. 5:17A(c) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
584. R. 5:17A(c)(ii)-(iii) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
585. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17A(e) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
586. R. 5:17A(f)-(g) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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permanent."'7 "If review is sought from a final order that deals
with injunctive relief and other issues, a petition for review must
address only that part of the final order that actually addresses
injunctive relief."' "[A] petition for review may be considered by
a single Justice of [the] Court, or by a panel of Justices."' 9 Addi-
tionally, "[a] respondent may file a response to a petition for re-
view within seven days of the date of service ... unless the [c]ourt
specifies a shorter time frame."59 "Notwithstanding the foregoing,
the Court may act on a petition for review without awaiting a re-
,,591
sponse ....
As mentioned above, the court also added Rule 5A:38, which
reads nearly identical to Rule 5:17A, except that it relates to peti-
tions for review filed with the Virginia Court of Appeals instead
of the Supreme Court of Virginia.592
M. Record on Appeal
By order dated April 10, 2015, the court slightly modified the
language of Rules 5:10 and 5A:7 to clarify that the record on ap-
peal from the trial court must include "the documents and exhib-
its filed or lodged in the office of the clerk of the trial court, in-
cluding any report of a commissioner in chancery and the
accompanying depositions and other papers .... ,9 Previously,
these Rules referred to "papers," which has been changed to "doc-
uments" to allow for a digital appellate record.59'
Significantly, the court added two new Rules concerning the
preparation and transmission of the digital appellate record: Rule
587. R. 5:17A(f)(i) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
588. Id.
589. R. 5:17A(f)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
590. R. 5:17A(g) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
591. Id.
592. Order Amending Rules 5:17A & 5A:38, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia
(Apr. 10, 2015) (effective July 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendme
nts/2015_0410_rule_5_17a_5a_38.pdf. Compare VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17A (Repl. Vol. 2015),
with VA. Sup. CT. R. 5A:38 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
593. Order Amending Rule 5:10 & 5A:7, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Apr.
10, 2015) (effective July 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/20
15_.0410_digrecsrule_5_10_5_13a_5_155a_7 5a 10_5a_10a.pdf; see VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:10
(Repl. Vol. 2015); VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:7 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
594. See R. 5:10 (Repl. Vol. 2015); R. 5A:7 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
20151
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
5:13A and Rule 5A:10A. 9' For courts that utilize the Case Imag-
ing System, a digital appellate record may be created instead of a
paper record.9 The new Rules specify the requirements for form,
exhibits, transmission, disposition, and availability of the digital
record. 97
The addition of new Rules for digital appellate records resulted
in minor changes to Rules 5:15 and 5A:10. Specifically, the court
replaced the word "papers" with "documents.598
N. Brief Requirements
In general, the majority of the Rule amendments resulting
from the court's April 10, 2015 orders are changes intended to
update and modernize the rules and to account for electronic fil-
ing. Rule 5:6, governing forms of briefs and other papers filed
with the Supreme Court of Virginia, outlines the physical format-
ting requirements for a filing.599 The court amended this section to
allow briefs, appendices, motions, and other papers to not only be
printed but also be produced on a screen.6 °° The court also re-
placed any mention of "paper" with "document."6 ' Subsection (c)
provides that "[n]o appeal shall be dismissed for failure to comply
with the provisions of this Rule," however, the clerk may require
that a document be redone to comply with the Rule.0 2 As amend-
ed, the Rule now states that "[flailure to comply after notice of
noncompliance ... may result in the dismissal of the case.
603
These same changes were made to Rule 5A:4, governing forms of
briefs and other papers filed with the Court of Appeals of Virgin-
a604ia.
6°
595. Order Amending Rules 5:13A & 5A:10A, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia
(Apr. 10, 2015) (effective July 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendme
nts/2015_0410_dig-recs rule 5 10 5 13a 5_15_5a_7_5a_10.5a10a.pdf.
596. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:13A(a) (Repl. Vol. 2015); VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:10A(a) (Repl. Vol.
2015).
597. R. 5:13A(b)-(f) (Repl. Vol. 2015); R. 5A:1OA(b)-(f) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
598. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:15 (Repl. Vol. 2015); VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:10 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
599. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:6 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
600. R. 5:6(a)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
601. Id.
602. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:6(c) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
603. Id.
604. Order Amending Rules 5:6 & 5A:4, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Apr.
10, 2015) (effective July 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/
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The general requirements for all briefs filed with the court, set
forth in Rule 5:26, were also amended.°  First, with regard to
page limits, the court added that "[bjriefs of amici curiae [must]
comply with the page limits that apply to briefs of the party being
supported.""6 6 Also, the court added subsection (), which provides
guidelines for when a party has technical problems with electron-
ic filing.6"7 The new Rule states:
If technical problems at the Supreme Court result in a failure to
timely receive the electronically filed brief or appendix, counsel shall
provide to the clerk of the [c]ourt on the next business day all docu-
mentation which exists demonstrating the attempt to electronically
file the brief or appendix, any error message received in response to
the attempt, documentation that the brief or appendix was later suc-
cessfully resubmitted, and a motion requesting that the [c]ourt ac-
cept the resubmitted brief or appendix.
The court made the same changes to Rule 5A:19, governing gen-
eral requirements for all briefs filed with the Court of Appeals of
Virginia." 9
Additionally, the court amended subsection (e) addressing cop-
ies of filings.61' As amended, the Rule states that "[t]he electronic
version must be filed in the manner prescribed by the VACES
Guidelines and User's Manual, using the Virginia Appellate
Courts eBriefs System (VACES)."b'' l In addition, ten printed cop-
ies of each brief must be filed in the clerk's office.612 "All briefs
shall contain a certificate evidencing the date and method of elec-
tronic transmission of the brief to opposing counsel."'613 Previously,
a party who failed to comply with these Rules or failed to file a
required brief forfeited his or her opportunity for oral argument;
however, the court amended this provision so that the court now
2015_0410_ebriefs rule_5_6_5_26_5_32_5a_4_5a_19_5a205a21 5a 25.pdf; see VA. SUP.
CT. R. 5A:4 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
605. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:26 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
606. R. 5:26(b) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
607. R. 5:26(j) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
608. Id.
609. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:19 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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has discretion to decide whether to sanction the party or withhold
oral argument."'
The court also similarly amended Rule 5A:19, governing how
copies of filings may be filed with the Virginia Court of Appeals.615
The Rule no longer requires seven copies of each brief to be filed
and one copy to be mailed or delivered to opposing counsel.616 In-
stead, an electronic version, in PDF, and four printed copies of
each brief must be filed with the clerk and the PDF served on op-
posing counsel.617 "For purposes of this Rule, service by email
shall be governed by Rule 1:17, which allows electronic transmis-
sion without the need of consent by opposing counsel."618 "The
electronic version must be filed in the manner prescribed by the
VACES Guidelines and User's Manual, using the Virginia Appel-
late Courts eBriefs System (VACES)."'619
0. Appendices
By order dated April 10, 2015, the court amended Rule 5:32,
which governs the appropriate time to file appendices and the
number of copies required when filing with the Supreme Court of
Virginia. 2' As amended, the Rule requires the appellant to file
three printed copies and an electronic copy of the appendix with
the appellant's brief, and the appellant must also serve a copy on
counsel for each party separately represented.621 The appendix
and a sealed volume of the appendix must be filed in the manner
prescribed by the VACES Guidelines and User's Manual, using
Virginia Appellate Courts eBriefs System.622 The court made simi-
lar changes to Rule 5A:25 governing the time to file appendices
614. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:26 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
615. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:19 (Repl. Vol. 2015).




620. Order Amending Rule 5:32, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Apr. 10, 2015)
(effective July 1, 2015), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2015_0410_e
briefs rule 5 _6 526_5_32_5a_4_5a195a205a215a_25.pdf; see VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:32
(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
621. R. 5:32(a)(3)(i) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
622. Id.; VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:32(b)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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House Bill 1315, relating to the information compiled and re-
tained by jury commissioners, amended and reenacted Virginia
Code sections 8.01-345, 24.2-404, and 24.2-427 to add new re-
quirements relating to juror qualifications.624 Specifically, the jury
commissioners must transmit to the State Board of Elections lists
of those persons not qualified to serve as jurors as a result of:
(i) not being a citizen of the United States, (ii) no longer being a resi-
dent of the Commonwealth, (iii) being a resident of another county or
city in the Commonwealth, (iv) having been convicted of a felony and
having not provided evidence that their right to vote has been re-
stored, or (v) having been adjudicated incapacitated.
6 25
The sheriff, clerk of court, or other official responsible for main-
taining this information must make this list available, upon re-
quest, to the general registrar for that locality.626 The bill also re-
quires the general registrars to utilize this information to identify
voters who are no longer qualified to vote and initiate list
maintenance procedures in accordance with current law.627
B. Temporary Injunction
On recommendation of the Boyd-Graves Conference,28 the
General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-628 to al-,
low that an application for a temporary injunction may be sup-
ported or opposed by an affidavit or verified pleading.29
623. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:25 (Repl. Vol. 2015).




628. TEMPORARY INJUNCTION: AFFIDAVIT OR VERIFIED PLEADING, VA. LEGIS. INFO. SYS.,
HB 1367, http://Ilis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp64.exe?ses=151&typ=bil&val=HB1367 (last
visited Oct. 1, 2015).
629. Act of Mar. 16, 2015, ch. 125 Va. Acts __ - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-628 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
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C. Experts
The General Assembly amended the Virginia Code to allow
nurse practitioners to testify as expert witnesses in a court of law
on certain matters within the scope of their activities as author-
ized by Virginia Code section 54.1-2952.60 Further, "nurse practi-
tioner" has been added to the definition of "health care provider"
appearing in Virginia Code section 8.01-581.1.631 Importantly, the
General Assembly made clear that the provisions of this bill are
not intended to be a codification of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.632
Virginia Code section 8.01-581.20 discusses the standard of
care in proceedings before the medical malpractice review pan-
el.633 As set forth in this section, health care providers licensed to
practice in Virginia are presumed to know the statewide standard
of care in their particular specialty of field of practice.34 House
Bill 1775 amended this section to state that this presumption of
knowledge of the standard of care also applies to health care pro-
viders licensed in other states and who meet the educational and
examination requirements for licensure in Virginia.635
D. Damages
In an effort to provide consistency, the General Assembly
amended and reenacted multiple sections of the Virginia Code re-
lating to punitive damages. Specifically, references to "exemplary
damages" or "punitive or exemplary damages" were changed to
simply "punitive damages."'636 The reason for this change being
630. Act of Mar. 17, 2015, ch. 295, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.2 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
631. Act of Mar. 17, 2015, ch. 295, 2015 Va. Acts __ - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
632. Id. Rule 702 discusses testimony of expert witnesses. FED. R. EVID. 702.
633. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
634. Id. Prior to this amendment, this presumption was limited to physicians and
nurses. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Cum. Supp. 2014).
635. H.B. 1775, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2015) (enacted as Act of Mar. 17, 2015,
ch. 310, 2015 Va. Acts __,
636. Act of Mar. 27, 2015, ch. 710, 2015 Va. Acts __ - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-40, -44.5, -622.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015); §§ 38.2-1501, -1603, -1701 (Supp.
2015); §§ 46.2-1527.5, -1527.10 (Cum. Supp. 2015); § 51.5-46 (Cum. Supp. 2015); §§ 54.1-
1123, -2116 (Supp. 2015)).
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that "exemplary" and "punitive" are interchangeable and thus
duplicative when they appear together. The bill also makes addi-
tional technical corrections.37
E. Statute of Limitations
With regard to actions for defamation, the statute of limita-
tions is one year from when the cause of action accrues.' As
amended, Virginia Code section 8.01-247.1 now provides that:
If a publisher of statements actionable under this section publishes
anonymously or under a false identity on the Internet, an action may
be filed under this section and the statute of limitations shall be
tolled until the identity of the publisher is discovered or, by the exer-
cise of due diligence, reasonably should have been discovered. 
639
F. Unauthorized Dissemination of Criminal History Records
During the 2015 session, the General Assembly added Virginia
Code section 8.01-40.3 relating to the dissemination of criminal
history record information.64 Importantly, the new section creates
a civil penalty for the wrongful dissemination of criminal history
record information that should have been expunged.64 This sec-
tion states as follows:
A. Any person who disseminates, publishes, or maintains or causes
to be disseminated, published, or maintained the criminal history
record information.., of an individual pertaining to that individu-
al's charge or arrest for a criminal offense and solicits, requests, or
accepts money or other thing of value for removing such criminal
history record information shall be liable to the individual who is the
subject of the information for actual damages or $500, whichever is
greater, in addition to reasonable attorney fees and costs.
B. Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability on:
637. See, e.g., H.B. 1610, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2015) (enacted as Act of Mar.
27, 2015, ch. 710, 2015 Va. Acts _, __) (amending "attorneys' fees" to "attorney fees" and
correcting the spelling of "judgment" in section 46.2-1527.10).
638. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-247.1 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
639. Id.
640. Act of Mar. 23, 2015, ch. 415, 2015 Va. Acts -' - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-40.3 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
641. Id.
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1. An interactive computer service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. §
230(f), for content provided by another person.
2. Any speech protected by Article I, Section 12 of the Constitu-
tion of Virginia.
C. As used in this section, "criminal history record information"
means the same as that term is defined in § 9.1-101.
Similarly, the General Assembly added section 8.01-40.3, which
creates a civil action against:
Any person who disseminates, publishes, or maintains.., the crimi-
nal history record information... of an individual pertaining to that
individual's charge or arrest for a criminal offense and solicits, re-
quests, or accepts money or other thing of value for removing such
criminal history record information shall be liable to the individual
who is the subject of the information for actual damages or $500,
whichever is greater, in addition to reasonable attorney fees and
costs.
6 43
G. Summons for Unlawful Detainer
Minor changes were made to certain sections of the Virginia
Code relating to unlawful detainer proceedings and satisfaction of
judgments. In an unlawful detainer proceeding where the tenant
fails to appear, the landlord, or the landlord's agent, may submit
evidence of outstanding rent, late charges, attorney's fees, and
other damages by affidavit or sworn testimony." Revised Virgin-
.ia Code section 8.01-126(C) also now requires that the landlord,
or the landlord's agent, advise the court of any payments made by
the tenant that would result in a reduction of the amount due as
of the date of the hearing.645 Section 8.01-126 also now provides
that:
In determining the amount due the plaintiff as of the date of the
hearing, if the rental agreement or lease provides that rent is due
and payable on the first of the month in advance for the entire
month, at the request of the plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney or
agent, the amount due as of the date of the hearing shall include the
rent due for the entire month in which the hearing is held, and rent
shall not be prorated as of the actual court date. Otherwise, the rent
642. Id.
643. Act of Mar. 23, 2015, ch. 415, 2015 Va. Acts __ - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-40.3 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
644. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-126 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
645. Id.
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shall be prorated as of the date of the hearing. However, nothing
herein shall be construed to permit a landlord to collect rent in ex-
cess of the amount stated in such rental agreement or lease. If a
money judgment has been granted for the amount due for the month
of the hearing pursuant to this section and the landlord re-rents
such dwelling unit and receives rent from a new tenant prior to the
end of such month, the landlord is required to reflect the applicable
portion of the judgment as satisfied pursuant to § 16.1-94.01."
Finally, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections
8.01-454 and 16.1-94.01 to clarify that a creditor is required to
note satisfaction of a judgment only when it has been paid in
full.
647
H. Circuit Court Clerk Responsibilities
During the 2015 session, the General Assembly revised certain
sections of the Virginia Code relating to the responsibilities of cir-
cuit court clerks. With regard to the posting of notices, summons,
orders, and other official documents, the notice requirement is
satisfied if such documents are posted on the public government
website of the locality served by the court or on the circuit court
clerk's website.648 Virginia Code section 8.01-217, relating to how
the name of a person may be changed, has been amended to clari-
fy that if a name change is granted to a convicted sex offender,
the clerk entering such an order must transmit a certified copy to
any agency or department of the Commonwealth that has issued
a license using such person's changed name, if known to the court
and identified in the court order.649 With regard to entering pay-
ment or discharge on the judgment docket, Virginia Code section
8.01-453 now provides that the clerk must only docket judgments
that have been satisfied in full-the clerk is not required to enter
partial satisfactions of judgments.65 Finally, Virginia Code sec-
646. Id.
647. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 631, 2015 Va. Acts -, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-454 (Repl. Vol. 2015)); Act of Mar. 23, 2015, ch. 547, 2015 Va. Acts, __
- (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-94.01 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
648. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 631, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 1-211.1 (Supp. 2015)).
649. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 631, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-217 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
650. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-453 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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tion 64.2-505 was amended to allow the clerk to compel a person-
al representative to produce a will or to require security.
651
I. Payment of Funds Into Circuit Court
Virginia Code section 8.01-600, pertaining to money held by the
clerk of the circuit court, was amended to provide that "where
judgment is taken in the circuit court, upon motion of a party for
good cause shown, the court may enter an order directing the
clerk to [hold certain funds]." '' The bill also adds subsection (C)
to Virginia Code section 8.01-606, which provides:
Where judgment is taken in the general district court, upon motion
of a party for good cause shown, the general district court judge may
enter an order directing the clerk of the general district court to hold
such funds... for a period not to exceed 180 days to enable such
party to file a petition ... requesting that such funds be received and
held by the clerk of the circuit court. 
5
3
If an order directing the clerk of the general district court to
transfer funds to the circuit court is not received within the 180-
day period, the clerk of the general district court may disburse
the funds to the plaintiff.6 54
J. Civil Immunity
Virginia Code section 8.01-225 provides that persons rendering
certain emergency services may not be found "liable for any civil
damages for acts or omissions resulting from the rendering of
such care.. ,,6 5 As amended, section 8.01-225 now provides the
following description of "emergency care or assistance":
For purposes of this subdivision, emergency care or assistance in-
cludes the forcible entry of a motor vehicle in order to remove an un-
attended minor at risk of serious bodily injury or death, provided the
person has attempted to contact a law-enforcement officer, as de-
651. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 631, 2015 Va. Acts -, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.2-505 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
652. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 633, 2015 Va. Acts , - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-600 (Repl. Vol. 2015)) (alteration in original).
653. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 633, 2015 Va. Acts -, (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-606 (Repl. Vol. 2015)).
654. Id.
655. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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fined in § 9.1-101, a firefighter, as defined in § 65.2-102, emergency
medical services personnel, as defined in § 32.1-111.1, or an emer-
656
gency 911 system, if feasible under the circumstances.
Senate Bill 1186 resulted in another change to section 8.01-225.
657
Specifically, this section now grants civil immunity to persons
who, "[i]n good faith, prescribes, dispenses, or administers nalox-
one or other opioid antagonist used for overdose reversal in an
emergency to an individual who is believed to be experiencing or
about to experience a life-threatening opiate overdose.658
K. Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions
Virginia Code section 8.01-417, as amended, now requires in-
surance companies to disclose the address of an alleged tortfeasor
upon the request of an injured person, personal representative, or
attorney in personal injury and wrongful death actions related to
motor vehicle accidents, if such address has not previously been
disclosed .69 The section also now states:
if the alleged tortfeasor has insurance coverage from a self-insured
locality for a motor vehicle accident ... and the locality is authorized
by the alleged tortfeasor to accept service of process ... the locali-
ty... may [instead] disclose the insured's work address and the
name and address of the person who shall accept service of process
on behalf of the alleged tortfeasor.
66
0
L. Petition for Attachment
The most significant change to Virginia Code section 8.01-537,
which relates to petitions for attachment, is that the amended
section removes judges from the list of persons before whom a pe-
tition for attachment shall be filed.661 As amended, section 8.01-
656. Id.
657. S.B. 1186, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225 (Repl.
Vol. 2015).
658. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
659. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-417 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
660. Id. (alteration in original).
661. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 639, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-537 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
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537 also adds magistrates to those who may receive payments for
an attachment petition.62
M. Habeas Corpus
Multiple subsections have been added to Virginia Code section
8.01-658, clarifying how a writ of habeas corpus is to be served." 3
Section 8.01-658 now specifies the proper respondent to be named
in a writ of habeas corpus based upon whether the petition is in
prison or jail, is on parole or probation, or has a suspended sen-
tence.6 4 As amended, section 8.01-658 now provides for amend-
ment of the petition if the petitioner does not name a proper re-
spondent.6 ' If the petitioner fails to name a proper respondent
within the time allotted by the court, the habeas petition must be
dismissed without prejudice."6
662. Id.
663. Act of Mar. 23, 2015, ch. 554, 2015 Va. Acts __ - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-658 (Repl. Vol. 2015).
664. Id.
665. Id.
666. Id.
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